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8. Christian Democracy and Confessional Culture in the Federal Republic
- University of Michigan Press
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180 Chapter 8 Christian Democracy and Confessional Culture in the Federal Republic Its major ideological and leadership struggles resolved, the CDU found itself on the eve of the August 14, 1949 Bundestag election in its strongest position to date. With its election victory, Christian Democrats would commence two decades of political leadership. Yet while the party could justifiably present itself as an unprecedented Protestant-Catholic alliance, the Catholic Teilkultur remained fractured and confessional tensions within the CDU were still potent, even as the Federal Republic would undergo far-reaching social transformations . The advent of individualism, consumerism, secularism, and deconfessionalization and the concurrent dissolution of the Catholic milieu would induce profound changes in the party and West German society. That Christian Democracy nevertheless remained marked by confessional difference testifies to the salience of religion in the Federal Republic. The CDU and the Center Party Considering the CDU’s indelible association with Catholic Germany, it is perhaps ironic that the party’s representation of the Catholic Teilkultur had never been undisputed. Especially as the CDU wrestled with the confessional school question in the Parliamentary Council, the Center Party remained an abiding concern for Christian Democrats, and party leaders resolved again to bridge the Catholic milieu’s political gap. When Karl Arnold reinitiated discussions with Center Party leaders in January 1949, he did so with Adenauer’s approval, even as Adenauer continued to highlight the risks of incurring Protestant ire by increasing Catholic influence within the party.1 The failure of this round of negotiations would have especially dire consequences for the Zentrum. After fusion attempts foundered on the opposition of some Center Party organizations and Christian Democracy and Confessional Culture in the Federal Republic 181 leaders, including Helene Wessel, significant numbers of Center members followed Karl Spiecker to the CDU.2 Catholic priests threw the weight of the church behind their politics by denying Center Party members a platform at church meetings and in publications and even banning them from Catholic ancillary organizations.3 The importance of clergy support for the CDU was not lost on Center Party stalwarts.4 In February 1949, Wessel complained that the CDU/CSU was “exploiting” the religiosity of large numbers of voters “with the help of upper clergy and part of the middle and lower clergy” in order “to make this West Germany into a clerical-fascist state.”5 When Wilhelm Böhler attempted to forge an agreement between the CDU and Center Party banning political attacks, Adenauer balked at, among other things, the proposition that the clergy treat the CDU and Center Party equally.6 Indeed, political attacks between the two Catholic cousins continued unabated . In particular, the Center Party would exploit the CDU/CSU’s failure to secure confessional schools and explicit protection of “seeds of a new life” in the Basic Law as evidence of Christian Democracy’s incapacity to represent Catholic voters and their concerns.7 Center Party propaganda made special mention of the number of Protestant delegates in the CDU faction,8 while Center Party leaders needled CDU Protestants over their lack of influence within the party.9 For his part, CDU representative Josef Schrage attacked unmarried Helene Wessel of the Center Party for advocating the Elternrecht while knowing nothing about raising children.10 The Center Party assault came as no surprise to the CDU, which with the passage of the Basic Law had resolved to develop a clear public relations line for the confessional school issue designed to account for the fact that “some members” had voted on the Bremen Clause with the SPD.11 As the CDU prepared for the first federal elections, Adenauer advised party members to eschew the school issue as it could only hurt the CDU politically.12 Helene Weber took a different tack, arguing that it was a mistake to imply that the Elternrecht had been left unprotected. Rather, only the “full Elternrecht,” she maintained, had failed to win constitutional protection; the Elternrecht was covered under the marriage and family law, specifically Article 6, paragraph 2, which guaranteed parents the right to care for and raise their children. Moreover, Weber insisted , in contrast to the Center Party, which before 1933 had revealed divisions on this issue, CDU/CSU representatives “fought until the end of discussions for the full Elternrecht.”13 Weber was echoed by Paul Steup, who also rejected the Center Party’s characterization of the CDU as unreliable in the larger “struggle for individual rights.” Warning against sowing dissension within the [35.173.215...