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2. Local Government at the Extremes: Viacha
- University of Michigan Press
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chapter 2 Local Government at the Extremes: Viacha The dramatic changes in investment patterns described in the previous chapter must originate in the decisions and actions undertaken by local governments all over Bolivia. This chapter and the next examine the institutional and social underpinnings of governance in two extreme cases of low and high performance in order to understand what drives public decision making in each. Introduction: 1997 Wilting under the afternoon sun,Viacha squats on the altiplano like a dusty cholita at market, tired after a long day selling pantyhose and cigarettes smuggled from Peru. Approaching along the old southern road from La Paz, the outer edges of El Alto lap like wavelets at the limits of Viacha, the two cities bridged by a thin line of nameless eateries and roadside mechanics that never quite peter out. One may be forgiven for considering Viacha a suburb of the La Paz–El Alto conurbation. Urban viacheños would take exception. They clearly think of their home as a city, and the surrounding countryside—when they think of it at all—as a catchment area of little importance . But to believe this is a mistake, as Viacha is in fact a large rural municipality with a medium-sized city in one corner. Of the seven districts that make it up, four are rural. Of its 54,761 inhabitants, two-thirds are dispersed among 300 rural communities that reach all the way to the border with Peru, with the remaining third living in the city.1 By Bolivian standards Viacha is a wealthy industrial town. It is home to the main cement plant of the Sociedad Boliviana de Cementos (SOBOCE), Bolivia’s largest cement company, as well as a large bottling plant belonging to the Cervecería Boliviana Nacional (CBN), Bolivia’s largest brewery. Both 48 companies contribute directly and signi‹cantly to Viacha’s municipal coffers through property taxes, business licenses, electricity bills, and—in the case of the CBN—generous in-kind lending of trucks and other heavy machinery , as well as large donations of beer, all placed at the mayor’s disposal. Strung along the main road out of Viacha are numerous medium-sized and small textile, brick and tile, and other construction-related businesses, all of which contribute to local incomes and tax receipts. Municipal income includes receipts from property and vehicle taxes, licenses and place-rents for businesses and street commerce, planning and zoning approval fees, and a number of other items—more than most other cities in Bolivia. But the city is curiously free of the signs of wealth, and hence of inequality, with neighborhoods ranging in appearance from poor peri-urban to middle class, but no higher. This is probably because the most successful Viachans take up residence in La Paz, underlining the city’s status as a dormitory town. Viacha ’s index of Unsatis‹ed Basic Needs2 (0.852 on a scale where 0 is best and 1 worst) places it in the best-off 25 percent of Bolivian municipalities; its proximity to the cities of La Paz and El Alto ensures a higher level of economic activity than other cities of comparable size. Yet by the middle of 1997 Viacha was a troubled town. After three consecutive electoral victories, the populist Unión Cívica de Solidaridad (UCS) party had lost its sheen in a hail of corruption accusations and was increasingly seen as ineffective. Two million bolivianos went unspent from the 1996 budget despite the mayor’s pleas that he lacked resources to satisfy communities’needs.A rival oversight committee (OC2) was established demanding the mayor’s resignation and disbandment of the of‹cial oversight committee (OC1—sanctioned by the municipal government). With two competing OCs (and two sets of neighborhood councils), the participative planning process broke down as the city became polarized between groups supporting the mayor and those demanding his resignation. In the midst of this poisonous climate, thieves broke into the municipal garage, killed the elderly guard, and stole two vehicles. This gave rise to further accusations and counteraccusations.“There are cars parked on the street all over La Paz and El Alto,” the president of OC1 said, explaining that one of the stolen vehicles had been located in El Alto.“If you want to steal a car, why would you come to Viacha and steal it from a guarded garage?”3 In his opinion, the crime was the work of the opposition seeking to sully the mayor’s...