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chapter 6 Loose and Nascent Communities Within the EU borders, a number of epistemic communities are not quite as established, cohesive, or prominent as those discussed thus far. While they may often appear weak, they are not necessarily failed actors. Some may be loose epistemic communities in which members come from a variety of professions and have different types of expertise. For example, they might not meet often, or they might share only broad policy goals. Others may be nascent, with the raw ingredients for a future epistemic community present but not yet coalesced into a body that can exercise agency. These groups are important because they may contain the seeds of future EU decision making. If competitive selection, rigorous training, frequent meetings , a strong body of shared professional norms, and a common culture are what give some epistemic communities high status, cohesiveness, and in›uence, one or more of these factors would have to be missing or weak to undermine the in›uence of a potential epistemic community. Alternatively, if the members of a network have policy preferences that derive not from their expert knowledge but from some other motivation—that is, they are not fully behaving like an epistemic community—this situation can undermine their neutral status and ability to be persuasive. By observing the inner workings of two key cases—the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research (GofP) and the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (Civcom)—I show why epistemic communities may ultimately be loose or nascent. In both cases, members of the network have varying types of expertise, with the GofP having a much more diverse membership than Civcom but both lacking homogeneity relative to the other case studies. The GofP was a loose epistemic community whose members came from a variety of different backgrounds. They were not held together by a strong body of shared professional norms, and the level of co186 hesiveness thus was low. Indeed, when the group reached the end of its mandate, the network fell apart.1 In contrast, members of Civcom grapple with a relatively new policy area that does not yet have a strong body of knowledge on which to draw. They must gain their experience and expertise on the job. Overall, when compared to a strong epistemic community such as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), Civcom falls a bit short. It does not have a well-de‹ned common culture or meet frequently in informal settings. The GofP was a short-lived epistemic community that lasted only a few years, while Civcom is a nascent epistemic community that will likely strengthen in the future. This chapter ‹rst examines the case of the GofP and its impact on the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR). This initiative, designed to spark integration of civilian security research, eventually led to the creation in 2007 of the European Security Research Program, which guides the EU’s medium- to long-term strategy to support common research on security technology. In addition to being a good example of how and why groups of scientists can affect security integration in Europe, the GofP adds a new dimension to this study. It is an epistemic community that no longer exists . Thus, this case addresses the question of why an epistemic community might lack staying power. While this is an important question, one constraint in the research of a disbanded epistemic community is that it is more dif‹cult to interview its members, who have moved on to different activities and are spread out geographically. However, one bene‹t of this case in particular is that it is a rare example of a scienti‹c community for which there is some available documentation, shedding light on the nature of members’ dialogue and subsequent development of shared norms and policy goals. Subsequently, I examine the role of Civcom in in›uencing civilian crisis missions under the European Security and Defence Policy. Along with the EUMC, Civcom provides the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with advice on how to proceed with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) planning. While Civcom mostly comprises midranking diplomats, it also includes a number of police experts. The growing trend, however, has been a gradual shift in favor of diplomats rather than police, so a homogenization of the group is likely to occur over time. This case study analyzes Civcom’s role in shaping civilian missions under CSDP. One challenge in investigating a group like Civcom is that much of the...

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