In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

chapter 7 Transnational Islam The last several chapters have attempted to demonstrate, on the basis of case studies drawn from some of the most important Muslim countries, that mainstream and nationally bounded Islamist political formations, whether in opposition or in power, represent the vast majority of Islamist groups in terms of numbers, membership, and their impact on politics and society within the Muslim world. A major reason for the preeminence of national formations is the fact that political Islam cannot be relocated from one place to another easily . This is the case because transplanted forms of Islamism will not be adequately sensitive to context, which, as earlier chapters have demonstrated, matters a great deal in determining the success or failure of Islamist movements. Transnational Islam loses both relevance and authenticity in the process of transplantation. Peter Mandaville explains: “Teachers in conservative Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan, while they may share certain of his views, do not disseminate the fatwas of Omar Bakri Muhammad from London. Student reading groups at universities in Indonesia, while they may share Tariq Ramadan’s emphasis on the democratic, multicultural possibilities of Islam, have never read his books . . . [I]t is important not to overstate the case when it comes to transnational Islam. While we may identify tendencies and general varieties of discourse, it becomes much more dif‹cult to establish direct causal linkages.”1 This conclusion is corroborated by Fawaz Gerges’s authoritative study of al-Qaeda. It clearly makes the point that militant transnational jihadis form a very small minority not only among Islamist political formations as a whole but also among militant jihadis themselves. However, as Gerges points out in his book, the transnational jihadis form “a tiny—but critical minority” among Islamist groupings.2 They are “critical” particularly for the international image of political Islam, because they engage in the most violent acts in 131 the name of Islam across the globe. Consequently, they have the most dramatic impact outside the Muslim world, helping to shape the image of political Islam globally as a violent and extremist ideology. Paradigmatic Change The transnational jihadi groups, which are increasingly denoted by the catchall term al-Qaeda, go beyond the local regimes to target the “far enemy,” the West in general and the United States in particular. The latter are perceived by these groups as crucial supporters and sustainers of the “near enemy,” the authoritarian and repressive regimes that stand in the way of turning the Muslim world into a true and borderless dar al-Islam based on the militants’ conception of the ideal Islamic model.3 The transnational jihadis have therefore turned the largely “defensive” mode in which mainstream Islamists operate both domestically and globally into an “offensive” one, by attacking the source of the problem—as they see it—that is located outside the Muslim world. For transnational jihadis, offense on a global scale is the best defense locally. They believe that the only way to stop the West’s unwanted interference in dar al-Islam is to in›ict damage on Western interests where it hurts most, thereby weakening the resolve of Western powers, especially the United States, to intervene in matters affecting the Muslim world. Their stated objective, reiterated time and again, is to eject Western powers, principally the United States, from the Muslim world, not only militarily, but also in terms of their capacity —politically, economically, and culturally—to in›uence developments in Muslim countries. In this sense, they not only represent the other side of the coin in terms of Huntington’s clash of civilizations but also pose a paradigmatic challenge to the current Western-dominated international order. While offensive in tactical conception, al-Qaeda is able to portray this strategy as a part of the Muslim world’s ongoing resistance to Western domination, in large part due to American policies in the Middle East that are perceived by large segments of Muslim populations as deliberately hostile to Muslim interests, especially Washington’s unquali‹ed support to Israel’s occupation of Palestine and, more recently, the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Al-Qaeda’s strategy of offense as the best defense was conceptualized in the statement “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” issued by the World Islamic Front (led by Osama bin Laden) on February 23, 1998. This statement pronounced the following ruling: “To kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all countries, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa...

Share