Changing Paths: International Development and the New Politics of Inclusion

3. Beyond the Political Impossibility Theorem of Agrarian Reform

3 Beyond the Political Impossibility Theorem of Agrarian Reform Ronald J. Herring AGRARIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AS DISMAL SCIENCE: VENERABLE CONCEPTS, NEW COALITIONS It is commonly said that the rural poor have been excluded by dominant paths of development. More accurately, the terms of inclusion have been adverse; when states and the elites that run them have needed labor, taxes, or soldiers, the poor were included. That agrarian reforms have periodically altered the terms of inclusion for the rural poor in substantial ways is widely recognized. Genuine agrarian reform sets the stage for new social dynamics and thus opens possibilities for alternative trajectories . The long-term consequences of rural asset redistribution at critical historic junctures illustrate the importance of a path-dependent view of development policy. Despite what seems to be a clear case in logic and history, agrarian reform has been slighted of late in discussions of pro-poor policy. The political impossibility theorem carries some but not all of the explanatory burden. The theorem states that, despite demonstrated merits of agrarian reform in terms of growth and social justice, it is politically impossible and thus not a policy choice. Though accurate for a wide range of times and places, the theorem is doubly dubious as a general forecasting tool. First, its narrow conceptualization of agrarian reform omits much that may be relevant to understanding potential coalitions. Second, it misses the rural property component underlying many contemporary struggles waged in other terms. Reports of the demise of agrarian reform on the ground are premature—empirically, analytically, and prescriptively. Asset distribution is at the core of relative poverty and wealth as well as political capabilities; the rich understand this and invest extensively in preserving and extending rules that protect and enhance concentrations 58 of property. Yet of‹cial and academic discourse about the poor has moved away from this most fundamental conclusion of political economy . The developmental paths of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are widely held to have been enabled by fairly radical agrarian reform.1 Yet when it comes to consideration of the poorest people in the poorest places in the contemporary world, redistribution recedes into silence. If there is genuine interest in poverty alleviation, this is a curious silence. Despite historical evidence of the costs of failure and the bene‹ts of success, recommendations of agrarian reform are often met with the response that bene‹cial policies are, alas, politically impossible—and thus unworthy of further consideration. The impossibility theorem rests on good political economy. Land confers power in agrarian systems; reform policy must work through that very system of power to restructure its base (Herring 1983). Conceptualization of agrarian systems as integrated nets of multidimensional social and economic control would predict not only compromised policy but, just as important, faulty implementation : power is expressed at all levels of the political system, from agenda setting to administration. The theorem is buttressed by the long history of failed agrarian reforms. Exceptions prove the rule; these have occurred through rare historical conjunctures—communist revolution (China), external intervention (Japan), or effective social democratic mobilization of the poor majority (Kerala State in India). When the landless are economically dependent and politically powerless, and sometimes consequently ideologically incorporated, the theorem is robust. Even in agrarian systems lacking dominant landlordism of classic form, redistribution is blocked by intermediate and relatively privileged classes—for example, by what the Rudolphs (1987) call “bullock capitalists ” in India. Limited redistribution continually creates veto blocs opposed to further redistribution—an unvirtuous ratchet. Having moved up, substantial farmers want to pull up the ladder after them: a dependent work force is in their interest, and their own limited prosperity seems paltry in comparison with urban extravagances of wealth. Their power vis-à-vis governments is structural if not directly political: “the nation” needs ever increasing production from agriculture, and uncertainty about changes in property systems may suppress investment (Herring 1983, chap. 8). Moreover, a political coalition for pro-poor reform is unlikely and for well known reasons: problems of collective action among dispersed actors without resources, economic dependency, multiple crosscutting political interests among the poor, diffusion of interests by entrepreneurial political parties, and the hostility of powerful classes with privileged access to state operatives.2 But surely theorems do not drive politics. The waning, then end, of the cold war reduced the political motivation for removing the agrarian base Beyond the Political Impossibility Theorem of Agrarian Reform 59 of...