In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

CHAPTER 3 Shifting Political Incentives at NASA and the FDA Unfortunately, it is difficult to eliminate type I and type II errors at the same time. Allocating resources or employing personnel in such a way as to reduce the incidence of one type of failure often serves to increase the probability that the other form of failure will occur. For example, it will be shown in the next chapter that organizational structures that limit type I errors are more vulnerable to type II failures. In the previous chapter, I have argued that the decision of where an appropriate balance should be struck is a function of both technological performance and political factors. As a first step in the process of verifying these claims, we now focus on the behavior of two agencies-the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-to see how political incentives may have affected their decision making. Political Incentives and NASA Behavior Understanding NASA's organizational changes requires that we first focus on the political factors that influence the agency. Our objective here is not to provide a comprehensive political history of NASA; it would take an entire volume to do so. Rather, the focus will be on how political factors affected NASA's balance between type I and type II reliability. To facilitate such an analysis, I broadly divide the discussion of NASA's history into four major periods: the creation of NASA, the Apollo era, the space shuttle era, and the post-Challenger era. The political history of the agency in each of these periods is presented and then followed by a brief discussion based on the principles mentioned in the previous chapter. The Creation of NASA The United States had been active in rocketry long before NASA was established . After World War II, the United States was able to acquire Germany's major rocket team, led by Wernher von Braun. The U.S. Army put von Braun to work on missile and rocket development, while other branches of the 37 38 Acceptable Risks military also found ways of getting involved in rocketry. The services competed with each other while a civilian organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), worked on the sidelines producing research on aerospace issues. The Soviet Union's launch of the satellite Sputnik I was accompanied by a large public outcry in the United States for more concerted and intensive action in the area of space. While President Eisenhower agreed to develop a more rigorous space policy, he was not convinced that such action was the best response to the situation. The success of Sputnik was certainly a propaganda advantage for the Soviets. But in regard to national security, Eisenhower did not believe that the Soviet launches represented a major disruption in the balance between the superpowers.l Furthermore, Eisenhower generally wanted to conserve the nation's resources and reduce the size of the federal government. As a result, he was not eager to expand government efforts in the area ofspace policy. Some supporters in Congress agreed with the president on this issue, but many more legislators were moved by the public's demand for action. In particular, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson took aim at the president on the space issue. Johnson formed a special committee on space and held hearings about the administration 's lack of effort on space policy. These rising political pressures eventually forced the administration's hand in expanding American space policy.2 President Eisenhower chose to respond to this issue by transforming the NACA into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958. In doing so, Eisenhower emphasized the civilian nature of space exploration over its military applications. There were a number of reasons why the president chose this option over the acceleration of one of the military's rocketry programs. First, an essentially new agency would be easier to control and maintain within the fiscal limits the administration wanted to set. Second, previous experience had shown that it would be difficult to choose one branch's program over the others without resulting in a great deal of political turmoil. Finally, Eisenhower was also concerned about the rising influence of the military-industrial complex and did not wish to fuel that relationship with the infusion of new space program funds.3 Moreover, Eisenhower was able to take advantage of the situation by transferring some of the military'S resources to the new civilian space program . Among...

Share