Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies

Index

Index Abbott, Diane, 150-51,207 Adenauer, Konrad, 81 Alesina, Alberto, 23, 31 Alford index, 87-88,91,93,202-3 Amsterdam Treaty, 166 Andreatta, Nino, 128, 134 Andreotti, Giulio, 131 Australia, 3 Austria, 34, 50 backbench legislators, 10-12,37,40, 42-44, 74-78, 107, 128, 199 Baffi, Paolo, 128 Balladur, Edouard, 27 Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) scandal, 144 Bank deutscher Lander (BdL), 80-81 Bank of England, 2, 6-7,14,22,24-25, 97, 126 independence blocked, 143-45 institutional changes, 145-47 nationalization of, 83- 86 1997 reform, 147-51 reform debates, 151-53 Bank of England bill (1946),84-86 Bank of France, 22, 26-27 Bank of Italy, 2, 22, 25-26, 127, 130, 132 "divorce" of, 2, 14, 25, 125- 26, 128, 134-35 evaluating reform, 136-37 Bank of the Netherlands, 48 Basle-Nyborg agreement, 168 Belgium, 3, 103, 169 Blair, Tony, 106, 147 Blugden, Nicholas, 144 Bollen, Kenneth, 93 Boothby, Robert, 86 Bretton Woods system,S, 124, 129, 158 Britain. See also Bank of England Bank of England bill (1946),84-86 conflict over EMS entry, 141-43 Conservative party, 83-86, 137, 139-41 European Monetary System (EMS), 141-43, 157, 164 Keynesian demand management, 138, 140-41 Labour Party, 6-7, 14,25,83-86, 106, 125-26,137-39,147-51 Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), 139, 141 pound crisis, 138 Thatcher government and Tory "wets;' 139-41 Trade Unions Congress (TUC), 138-39 Westminster political system, 83,145 Brown, Gordon, 148-49 budget cuts, 21 budget deficits, 103 Bundesbank. See German Bundesbank Bundesrat, 81-83 bureaucratic delegation, 33-34 cabinet, 1,37,40-41,74-78,199 central bank independence and, 11-12 231 232 Index cabinet (continued) durability, 100, 107-9, 123 informational advantages of, 41-42 informational checks on, 43-45 monetary-policyauthority,10 political control, 29-30 as strategic actors, 59 cabinet durability statistical model, 107-19 dependent variable, 113-14 descriptive statistics, 113 methodology,114-15 results, 115-19 sample, 112-13 Callaghan, James, 138-39 Cameron, David, 92,112 capital mobility, 32, 33, 102, 105, 107, 109,172 Caplin, Ivor, 150 Carli, Guido, 26, 127 Carter, Jimmy, 63 central bank, 1,3, 161, 172, 177 bankers as strategic actors, 59 conventional explanations for, 8-9, 30-35 reform trends, 2-3,5-6,13-14,119-23 central bank independence, 19-22 accountability of, 58 appointments procedure, 21,27-28, 49-50,58 bureaucratic delegation, 33-34 cabinet's ability to punish, 21, 50-51 central bank reform in 1990s, 2-3, 5-6,13-14,119-23 commitment to, 4-5 cross-national variation (1970-90),4, 12-13,23,86-98 alternative hypotheses, 89-93 coalition and minority government, 88 constituent preferences, 87 economic openness, 91 electoral institutions, 87 incentive divergence, 87 interest groups, 92- 93 legislative institutions, 87 measurement of variables, 87-88 partisanship,91-92 polarization, 87 results, 88-89 sample, dependent variable, and methodology,88 sensitivity analysis, 93-96, 204-5 threat of punishment, 87 defined) 19-22 democratic governance and, 69- 71, 179-80 explanations for, 8-9, 12-16,30-35, 89-93 federalism and, 4,12-13,73,96-98 inflation and, 2, 31 international political economy and, 32-33 macroeconomic theory and, 30- 32 measurement of, 22,199-200 political benefits of, 49-55, 69-71 political control and, 19-20,27-30 political credibility of, 49-51 political parties and, 9, 11-12,53-55 political strategy, 58-60 price stability and, 19- 20 rankings of (1970-90),23 reform of political institutions and, 7, 15,153-54 reform trend, 2-3, 5-6, 13-14, 119-23 threats to status, 28-29, 52-53 timing of reform, 14-15, 119-23 central bank institutions, 22-27. See also specific bank appointments procedure, 21, 27-28, 49-50,58 contracting approach, 20, 199 cross-national variation, 4, 12-13,23, 86-98 political choice of, 53-54 political systems and, 78-86 central bank reform in 1990s, 2-3, 5-6,13-14, 119-23 economic openness and, 120, 123 explaining patterns of, 119- 23 partisanship and, 122-23 party system changes and, 100-107 political institutional reform and, 7, 15, 153-54 political pressures, 153 variations in timing of, 6, 119-23 Centre for Economic Policy Research, 144 Chirac, Jacques, 162, 167 Churchill, Winston, 86...