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Chapter 1. Introduction
- University of Michigan Press
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Chapter 1 introduction The natural effect of commerce is to bring about peace. Two nations which trade together, render themselves reciprocally dependent; if the one has an interest in buying and the other has an interest in selling ; and all unions are based upon mutual needs. —Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws It is really dif‹cult to understand the claim of the free-traders who imagine that the more advantageous application of capital will abolish the antagonism between industrial capitalists and wage workers. On the contrary, the only result will be that the antagonism of these two classes will stand out still more clearly. —Karl Marx, “On the Question of Free Trade” Throughout history policymakers, theorists, and the general public have debated the virtues and vices of foreign trade. The post–Cold War era has witnessed a resurgence of these debates, with scholars and policymakers divided over whether trade will produce desirable or adverse consequences within and between nation-states. In recent years, international relations scholars have turned their attention to assessing the validity of one presumed bene‹t of trade—the promotion of interstate peace. Unfortunately, few scholars have investigated systematically the long-standing liberal proposition that trade promotes peace, nor have they investigated those advanced by critics of liberalism. A systematic test of these propositions is critical, since foreign trade has become a central feature of domestic and foreign policy agendas of many states. Thus, answering basic questions about trade’s impact not only is theoretically interesting, but also has important policy implications. Although the Cold War was different than major power hot wars, the post–Cold War period has been marked by the same type of cosmopolitan rhetoric that followed other major world wars. Liberal scholars and their policy allies argued that free trade and the expansion of ties between states was the best way to unite former adversaries, as well as traditional allies. Liberals employed arguments about the virtues of trade that included an explanation of how economic interdependence creates incentives for cooperation, reduces misperceptions, and fosters formal and informal mechanisms conducive to resolving con›icts of interest that might arise between states. Moreover, many liberals argued that trade could be and should be used as a substitute for military strategies in foreign policy. This included employing policies of constructive engagement when seeking to alter another state’s undesirable behavior, including the target state’s internal and external aggression. Here liberals maintain, and many believe, that trade is capable of transforming the most oppressive, authoritarian regimes into peace-loving democratic societies. In fact, some portray trade as the panacea for the earth’s scourges, ranging from the distasteful characteristics of human nature to poverty and war. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence supporting liberal claims linking trade to peace, like other liberal views of commerce, is limited. If policymakers are to continue to advocate trade as a peace-inducing policy, we must ‹rst understand whether economic ties are capable of producing the desired effects on interstate relations. In this respect, Blainey’s warning about liberal theories of peace, in general, is applicable to the issue of trade: Irrespective of whether the creed rests on sound or false premises of human behavior, it still in›uences international relations. . . . If it is based on false generalizations about the causes of war and the causes of peace its in›uence in promoting peace is likely to be limited and indeed haphazard. (1973, 29) I begin my investigation by considering what I refer to as the unconditional liberal hypothesis—that trade promotes peace regardless of the nature and context of economic linkages.1 Then I turn to a discussion of competing propositions advanced by critics of liberalism. My purpose is to underscore the differences that exist in trading relationships and the manner in which these differences might produce outcomes that differ from the liberal model of a commercial peace. Critical theories of economic relationships suggest that trade’s impact may vary: some trading relationships may be peaceful, while others are con›ictual. In light of these arguments, I outline the conditions under which economic ties should be bene‹cial and those in which the costs may outweigh the 2 the liberal illusion [44.204.94.166] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 16:40 GMT) bene‹ts. Doing so will enable me to draw linkages between the presumed consequences that result from different forms of trade dependence and the impact this has on interstate relations. By pursuing such a strategy, I am...