Choice-Free Rationality: A Positive Theory of Political Behavior

5. Political Causes

CHAPTER 5 Political Causes I start by imputing a couple of concessions to an otherwise skeptical reader of the preceding portion ofthe book. One, I imagine this reader conceding that the first chapter shows why reasonable people can disagree over the proper definition ofrationality. Two, I imagine the reader conceding that chapters 2, 3, and 4 show that the CEU definition has some empirical power. There is a case for treating CEU maximization as a basis for rational choice theory. This conciliatory attitude, I trust, also has its limits. No one needed an alternative definition of rationality, the skeptical reader might say, to create reasonable doubts about current rational choice theory. Existing experimental evidence is troubling enough. So ifthis evidence has not sufficiently motivated most rational choice theorists to change their working assumptions, doubts motivated by CEU theory certainly will not. Simply put, theory does not offer knockdown arguments and will certainly not be more persuasive than the facts. In this chapter, I hope to show that the two central themes animating CEU theory-the problem offree-willed agency and the calculation ofprobabilities conditional on acts-are by no means artificial or imported. They arise naturally as important problems in settings where CEU theory is not explicitly at issue. Rational choice theory, in other words, cannot avoid the challenge CEU theory poses simply by ignoring CEU theory itself. The issues of free will and conditional expectation are encountered in practice. My illustration ofhow the problem of free will intrudes into ordinary research is drawn from the field of economic policy analysis. Policy analysis is particularly relevant insofar as analysts provide recommendations to policymakers based on predictions of economic outcomes conditional on alternative policies. The normative intent of this brand of policy analysis is clear yet is implemented at a much higher level of aggregation and importance than the microlevel normative versus empirical problems we have considered to this point. The issue of conditional expectations is illustrated by George Tsebelis's (1990) detailed game theoretic study ofEuropean parliamentary systems. How do institutionalized cooperative arrangements affect political outcomes? Tsebelis asks. How, more fundamentally, are these institutional arrangements created on the basis of noncooperative relations, that is to say, relations in which partnerships or coalitions are not binding but exist at the sufferance of 143 144 Choice-Free Rationality the participants'? Tsebelis's substantive analysis, it turns out, produces empirically valuable results whose assumptions, if philosophically offensive to anyone. offend the restrictions demanded by proponents of EU theory. This chapter, in short, is designed to reinforce the message of the preceding four chapters. CEU theory is a natural tool whose assumptions are important for empirically oriented rational choice analysis and sophisticated methodology . The deeper issues CEU theory raises can only be avoided in name. Put another way. the case for CEU theory does not require special philosophical leverage. Objections to it do. An idealized illustration of policy advice guided by rational choice theory might proceed as follows. An elected official in political trouble seeks the advice of his policy adviser to determine how best to restore his standing for the next election. After being provided by the official with all the relevant infonnation and informed of this policymaker's goals, she responds, "If you were rational ..." and lays out a detailed economic strategy based on the solution to the policymaker's optimization problem. The official follows the new strategy to the letter and triumphs at the polls. What is wrong with this parable? One obvious answer is that it overestimates those who give and receive advice. In order to develop the paradox of policy advice. I nonetheless assume the ideal rationality of all participants. In particular. all are assumed to have rational expectations, meaning they use information optimally based on a correct model of political-economic processes . But this assumption suggests a more important problem with the parable : the asymmetry implied by the existence of an irrational policy ex ante and a rational policy ex post. Would not a consistently rational officiaL who by stipulation has all the information her adviser has. avoid the kinds of problems advisers can fix and therefore eliminate the need for their advice? Conversely, does rational choice theory purchase its influence on policy at the expense ofits own rationality assumption') These are not invented questions. Explicit recognition of the paradox of policy advice historically developed in the context of new classical models of political economy (e.g.. Lucas 198 L Sargent and Wallace 198 L Barro and Gordon...