-
6 The Lebanese Swamp, 1981–2000
- University of Michigan Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
6 The Lebanese Swamp, 1981–2000 1. introduction By now it is widely recognized that the Lebanon War was a disaster for Israel, a minor one perhaps, but a disaster nevertheless. The only one person who fails to admit it is Ariel Sharon, the chief architect of that war. But the scope and nature of the debacle in Lebanon have never been fully explored. This chapter examines the roots, dimensions, and implications of the ‹asco that was ironically labeled “Operation Peace for Galilee.” The high-intensity part of the war lasted roughly three weeks. If we include in that phase the limited military operations, termed the “creeping occupation,” undertaken by the IDF during the months of July and August, then the war lasted from June 6 to August 22, 1982, about two and a half months. Even if we mark the end of the war by the landing of the U.S. and French marines in west Beirut in September, the actual shooting war was fairly brief. Israel’s involvement in Lebanon, however, had only begun, extending for eighteen more years. The Lebanon War really ended only on May 29, 2000, when the last IDF soldier left Lebanese soil. From August 1982 to May 2000 Israel fought a different war, a guerrilla war, and this war exposed Israel to a large array of strategic , social, and political problems. There is no question that the Lebanon War was a war of Israeli aggression . Israelis prefer to use the “war of choice” understatement, but the 171 meaning and import of that term are just the same. The consensus about the aggressive nature of the war makes a discussion of the war seemingly super›uous. We can clearly use this war to document the argument that it was made possible by the two common conditions that were at the root of previous wars: the emergence of a revisionist and aggressive scheme by elements of Israel’s leadership and the stupidity, miscalculation, and incompetence of the highest order in other sectors of Israeli political leadership and its social and political institutions. The Lebanon War presents a number of puzzles. One is “the paradox of power and con›ict outcomes” (Maoz 1989; 1990b, chap. 8; Maoz and Felsenthal 1987). The paradox is that Israel lost the war not despite the fact that it is more powerful but because it is more powerful. The gaps in military capability between Israel and all players in the Lebanese political arena were overwhelming. Yet, Israel was forced to leave Lebanon with its tail between its legs. This did not happen in previous wars, when the balance of capabilities was seemingly in favor of the Arabs or when the balance in favor of Israel was not as lopsided as in the 1982–2000 period. Why the vastly more powerful side lost the war is dif‹cult to explain, and quite a few alternative accounts exist (e.g., Merom 2003; Levy 2003, 146–70). Another puzzle concerns what I call “the sunk cost paradox.” This paradox concerns the dif‹culty of a state to extract itself out of a losing situation even though it is aware that it cannot win a war and even if it is well aware that it is going to lose. Therefore, it takes more time and casualties for a would-be loser to end the war than to admit defeat (Maoz 1990b, 290–94). When that study (Maoz 1990b) was published, Israel’s withdrawal to the security zone in southern Lebanon seemed to have ended this misadventure. It turns out that the loser’s paradox was exacerbated in the ensuing period. The continued Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory brought about a bitter con›ict between Israel and the Hizballah. The Galilee, for which the war was supposed to ensure peace, was actually subjected to repeat shelling by Hizballah. Most important, over 350 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed during this period. Israel ‹nally withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000 in a manner that accentuated the depth of the military and political defeat in the war. Thus, we need a more elaborate explanation of the Israeli entrapment in Lebanon. The role of the army and intelligence community in this episode was never fully analyzed. Neither do we have an explanation for the silence of various elements of Israeli public opinion. The severity of the sunk cost paradox is illustrated by the fact that the Israeli withdrawal 172 DEFENDING THE HOLY LAND [52.14.200.91] Project MUSE...