Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy

Notes

Notes chapter 1 1. For the standard de‹nition of MIDs see Gochman and Maoz 1984, 586. 2. In contrast, in the United States—the only global power in the third millennium —only one out of every thirty-‹ve Americans of relevant age is in uniform and only one out of thirty-two dollars that Americans produce goes to defense. 3. The reader may consult almost any of the major works on Israel’s history, national security, and foreign policy for a more elaborate discussion of these ideas (e.g., Tal 2000; Yaniv 1987a, 1995; Levite 1989; Brecher 1972; Kober 1995; Handel 1995; Cohen, Eisentadt, and Bacevich 1998). The concise and lucid exposition of the foundational logic of Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion in Shlaim 2000 (11–22), focusing on the “Iron Wall” concept, is particularly useful here. 4. For a discussion of types of deterrence see Morgan 2003 (8–26, 80–115). General deterrence refers to the use of threats to prevent an all-out attack on the state. Speci‹c deterrence concerns the attempt to prevent—through the threat of military retaliation—the violation of speci‹c aspects of the status quo that do not necessitate an all-out attack by the enemy. 5. The methodological and theoretical problems with the analysis of counterfactuals in international politics are too elaborate to consider here. For statements on these issues as they relate to world politics, see Fearon 1991; Tetlock and Belkin 1996; Lebow 2000. chapter 2 1. Brecher (1975, 253) notes that, in an interview he held with Ben-Gurion in 1971, the former prime minister and defense minister mentioned that the two main objectives of the campaign were ending the Fedayeen in‹ltrations and opening the Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping. 2. The elements of this weapons deal are listed in a number of sources, with considerable cross-source discrepancies. What is important here is the perception of Israeli decision makers. In this context, the most relevant list is given in Bar-On 1991 633 (12–13). The list includes 90–100 Mig-15 ‹ghter planes, 48 Ilyushin jet bombers, 170 T-34 tanks and 60 Stalin heavy tanks, 200 BTR armored personnel carriers (APCs), over 570 cannons of various sizes and ranges, 2 destroyers, and 6 submarines. The deal also called for the replacement of all light weapons in the Egyptian armed forces with Soviet-made ri›es and undisclosed amounts of ammunition and bombs. 3. Sources for the Israeli threat perception arising from the Egyptian-Soviet weapons deal include Bar-On 1991, 15–32, 35–42; 1992, 13–39; Brecher 1975, 243–54; Ben-Gurion 1959, 33–60, 95–110, 192–218; Dayan 1959, 9–23; and Toren 1990, 180–95. Brecher’s work provides a rigorous analysis of these perceptions and their policy implications in terms of advocacy of military and/or political options by various decision makers. 4. Golani (1997, 16) mentions also the intent to derail an inter-Arab coalition aimed at attacking Israel, the formation of which appeared imminent to Israeli decision makers in 1955–56, but this is not well supported by other sources. 5. All the quantitative data in this book are based on the project entitled “Quantitative History of the Arab-Israeli Con›ict” (QHAIC), unless alternative sources are speci‹ed. The data are available at the project’s Web site at http://psfaculty.ucdavis .edu/zmaoz/quanthist.html. Data were collected by Zeev Maoz and Ranan Kuperman (Kuperman 2001). The number of casualties in this ‹gure includes both Israeli civilians killed due to in‹ltrations by irregulars and Israelis (civilians and soldiers) killed by shelling and military operations by Arab states. For similar ‹gures see Morris 1993, 99–102; and Tevet 1971, 430–32. 6. These data show that between 1949 and 1956 a total of 756 Israelis were killed and 1,230 were wounded. This is equivalent to a rate of 756,000 dead and 1,230,000 wounded if this had taken place in the United States at roughly the same time. 7. Morris (1993, 64–67) recounts several incidents wherein alleged Egyptian intelligence of‹cers tried to recruit Palestinians in the West Bank to conduct in‹ltrations . Also, he mentions several incidents wherein intelligence-gathering operations by Bedouins and Egyptian agents resulted in Israeli deaths. However, there is no conclusive evidence that prior to February 28, 1955, an Egyptian policy existed to encourage or instigate in‹ltrations. On the other hand, there exists ample political evidence...