Thailand’s Political Peasants: Power in the Modern Rural Economy

Introduction: Peasants, Power, and Political Society

In recent years, Thai public life has been preoccupied with issues of power. In September 2006, the controversial government of billionaire businessman Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown in a military coup. The tanks that rolled onto the streets of Bangkok had yellow ribbons tied around their gun barrels. Yellow is the color of Thailand’s long-reigning king, Bhumibol Adulyadej. By binding the immense potency of the king to their political cause, the coup makers were hoping to demonstrate that it was reasonable to depose a government that derived its legitimacy only from electoral mandate. Royal power, with its illustrious mix of Buddhist virtue and righteous rule, was used to trump parliamentary authority. According to the coup makers, the power of Thaksin, and his formidable party machine, lay in an unsavory tangle of money, violence, patronage, and, quite possibly, unorthodox dealings with dubious supernatural forces. The impure electoral influence of his government arose out of populist appeals to the parochial self-interest of poorly educated voters in the rural north and northeast. With the aging king’s health gradually failing, there was real concern among some sections of Thailand’s elite that the preeminent power of the royal center was being challenged. They were right to be worried. Thaksin’s dramatic electoral rise showed that power could be produced in new networks of influence. Rural Thailand has experienced decades of economic diversification and administrative integration , and, despite many predictions of its demise, the peasantry has emerged as a powerful political force. Changes within the countryside have nurtured new cultures of inclusion and a reluctance to accept the old political axiom that governments are made in the provinces but unmade in Bangkok.1 Introduction Peasants, Power, and Political Society 3 The rural reaction to the coup itself was muted, although there were some protest rallies and a few cases of arson in the provinces. Members of the royalist government appointed by the military after the coup worked hard to erase Thaksin’s populist legacy. They emphasized the need for rural people to be trained in genuine democratic values, and they made the king’s “sufficiency economy” philosophy that rural people should live simply and with modest expectations for commercial inclusion a centerpiece of their policy platform. However, there were ominous signs of discontent when most provinces north of Bangkok voted to reject the constitution proposed by the coup makers in a referendum held in August 2007. A few months later the work of the coup was undone when, on the strength of votes from the rural north and northeast, a new government aligned with the exiled Thaksin was formed after the postcoup election of 23 December 2007. The Bangkok elites could not accept that result. Not long after the election , the anti-Thaksin forces, clad in royal yellow shirts, took to the streets of Bangkok. They occupied Government House and steadily ratcheted up their provocation in the hope of triggering another coup. The new pro-Thaksin government lasted less than a year, falling in the wake of the yellow shirts’ occupation of Bangkok’s international airport and a series of unfavorable court decisions. A new anti-Thaksin government was cobbled together in December 2008, with strong military backing. The reaction to this second “coup” was much less restrained. Over the new-year (songkran) holiday period in April 2009, pent-up anger exploded as the red-shirted supporters of Thaksin rampaged through Bangkok, only to be dispersed by a formidable display of military force. Bangkok’s fiery songkran riots ushered in another year of political polarization. The red shirts returned to Bangkok in March 2010 determined to force the government to a new election. The Bangkok Post described the arrival of the protesters from the north and northeast as a “rural horde” descending on the capital.2 It was one of the biggest protest crowds that Bangkok had ever seen. Many thought that the rally would dissipate after a few days—a week or so at the longest—but the protesters demonstrated remarkable resilience and logistical capability. The rural occupation paralyzed parts of central Bangkok for more than two months. Eventually the government could wait no longer, and in mid-May the army moved in. Red-shirt guards responded with slingshots, homemade fireworks, Molotov cocktails, and a seemingly endless supply of burning tires. Some antigovernment hard-liners were armed with rifles and grenade launchers. But the protesters were no 4 Introduction [18.225.149.32] Project MUSE (2024-04-18 10:58 GMT...