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8. Waging (Civil) War Abroad: Rwanda and the DRC
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132 8 Waging (Civil) War Abroad Rwanda and the DRC filip reyntjens Introduction The wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the entire Great Lakes region are the consequence of a unique combination of factors, chief among them the collapse of the Zairian/Congolese state and the territorial extension of neighbors’ civil wars (see Reyntjens 2009). This chapter deals with the way in which the Rwandan conflict was—and still is—fought out in the DRC. When Rwanda, hiding behind a Zairian “rebellion,” invaded in 1996, it was faced with a genuine security concern. The regime change in Kinshasa, engineered by a formidable regional coalition, did alleviate that concern, but relations with the new regime soured rapidly, and Rwanda (and Uganda), hiding behind a new “rebellion” created in Kigali, again invaded in 1998. The security rationale gave way to a logic of exploitation of natural resources and to a larger geopolitical design aimed at establishing a Rwandan space of political and military control in eastern DRC. In the course of its military campaigns and political interference in the DRC, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has exported practices used since it invaded Rwanda in 1990: these include a proactive, often arrogant behavior founded on a sense of entitlement, astute information management, a military F i l i p R e y n t j e n s 133 way of dealing with political space, and a profound disrespect for human life. Rwanda’s aggressive behavior has further exacerbated ethnic antagonism, and even contributed to a process of ethnogenesis, pitting two nonexistent ethnic groups, “Bantu” and “Hamites,” against each other. As has happened inside Rwanda, the regime’s practices have led to a dangerous level of structural violence in eastern DRC. From Dealing with Refugee-Warriors to Regime Change in Kinshasa Although the Rwandan civil war formally ended with the RPF’s victory in July 1994, the flight of the defeated army (Forces armées rwandaises [Rwandan Armed Forces, FAR]), the militia, and more than one million civilians to Zaire exported the conflict. When the FAR entered Zaire in July 1994, they were only partly disarmed, and some of the weapons and ammunition seized were later resold to them by the Forces armées zaïroises (Zairean Armed Forces, FAZ). Until mid-1996, military equipment continued to reach them in the Goma region, despite an embargo decreed by the UN Security Council. These “refugee-warriors” (see Zolberg et al. 1989, 278) were not just the passive beneficiaries of international assistance but also actors in their own right with a clear goal in mind: they intended to recapture power in Rwanda. For a number of these Rwandans in “humanitarian sanctuaries” (Rufin 1996, 27), this objective probably included finishing an unfinished job: the genocide. The instability caused by the presence of Rwandan refugees was not limited to eastern Zaire. From the beginning of 1995, the western préfectures (provinces ) of Rwanda (Cyangugu, Kibuye, and Gisenyi) increasingly became the theater of raids and infiltration. Although these insurrectionist activities were initially of low intensity, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) had a great deal of trouble containing them and the number of civilian victims grew constantly. Clearly the situation that developed just a few kilometers across its borders was Rwanda’s affair, and a vital one at that. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintained refugee camps that were both too large and too close to the Rwandan border because it erroneously believed there would be a rapid return of the refugees. When the Zairian government asked the UN to move the refugees away from the border by resettling them in the former military training centers of Irebu, Lukandu, and Kongolo, this was refused because of the “high cost” of the operation. In addition, no effort was made to separate the civilian refugees from the armed elements among them. Moreover, the strong control [3.82.58.213] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 08:32 GMT) 134 Wa g i n g ( C i v i l ) Wa r A b r o a d of populations, very typical of Rwanda, was exported to the camps, where the refugees were organized into cells, sectors, municipalities, and préfectures and tightly “administered.” In a speech on February 19, 1995, then vice president Paul Kagame set the tone by stating: “I wholeheartedly hope that these attacks take place! Let them try! I do not hide it. Let them...