On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy

Questioning Richardson's "Heidegger I, Heidegger II" Distinction and His Response in Light of Contributions to Philosophy

Questioning Richardson's "Heidegger I, Heidegger II" Distinction and His Response in Light of Contributions to Philosophy - Aber Lebendige machen aile den Fehler, daiS sie zu stark unterscheiden. Rilke One of the indisputably significant aspects of Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought is the preface to this work, which Heidegger consented to write after reading the German version of a resume of Richardson's research and findings.88 Two points here should not go unnoticed. First, because the text of the resume does not have the form of a dialogue, with two exceptions, it is unclear what questions Richardson put to Heidegger in the course of their "long and wideranging discussion."89 Second, Heidegger's preface to Richardson's book was not originally written as a preface but rather as a response to a letter that Richardson wrote to him on March 1, 1962. The difference between Richardson's letter and his resume is significant because Heidegger clearly states his intention at the very opening of his response: "It is with some hesitation that I attempt to answer the two principal questions you posed in your letter of March 1, 1962." The two principal questions are "How are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?" and "Granted that a 'reversal' has come-to-pass in your thinking, how has it come-to-pass? In other words, how are [we] to think this coming-to-pass itself?"90 It is presumably in conjunction with this second question that Richardson introduces his celebrated distinction between a "Heidegger I" and a "Heidegger II." We glean this from Heidegger's comments on 186 Copyrighted Material Richardson's "Heidegger I, Heidegger II" Distinction and reactions to this distinction: "The distinction you make between Heidegger I and Heidegger II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger 11."91How are we to understand the proviso under which Heidegger places Richardson's distinction between "Heidegger I" and "Heidegger II"? It states clearly that the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II. But when we turn to Richardson's resume for some clue to understanding this proviso, we find almost nothing. Richardson's summary of his findings as presented to Heidegger consists of five points. The first point ascertains a transformation of phenomenology necessitating "the transfer of focus from There-being [Da-sein] to Being." The second point presents an interpretation of die Kehre as a shift of focus "imposed by the dynamism of Heidegger's original experience of Being." (In his own translation of the preface as well as throughout Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, Richardson renders die Kehre as "reversal.") The third point explains why Sein und Zeit II never came to be written. Here Richardson alludes to the inadequacies of the language of metaphysics- inadequacies that Heidegger II gets rid of by "making in his own way a re-trieve of Heidegger I." The fourth point explains the forgottenness of being in terms of the finitude of being, and finally the fifth point considers how Heidegger's dialogues with the philosophers of the past ensue from a method of retrieve , that is, "a manner of articulating his own experience of Being."92 Whether we consider these points individually or together, we do not find a satisfying interpretation of die Kehre that would make Heidegger 's proviso fully understandable. This is especially true if we consider the second and third points together; if "Heidegger II" shows a "shift" in which Heidegger "makes in his own way a re-trieve of Heidegger I," this re-trieval still does not account for how the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II. Clearly we must approach this matter in a way that is different from Richardson's resume. If we draw from volumes of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe ,especially Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)-none of which was accessible to Richardson in 1962-we find fertile ground for determining the roots that give rise to Heidegger's proviso according to which the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible as contained in Heidegger II. Copyrighted Material [18.224.44.108] Project MUSE (2024-04-23 10:31 GMT...