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14 From NonbeUigerence to Neutrality, 1942-1945 As the war drew nearer to Spain in 1942-43, Franco's policy varied only slightly. He still expected and indeed hoped for an eventual German victory , while maintaining the nonbelligerent policy of habil prudencia with its tilt toward the Axis. The Allied landings in northwest Africa on November 8, 1942 (Operation Torch) brought the war closer than at any previous time. German forces acted swiftly to occupy the southern halfof France previously controlled by the Vichy regime, sealing the entire Pyrenean border with Spain, now caught between two fires. A few hours after the AngloAmerican landings began, a personal letter from Roosevelt was handdelivered to Franco by the new American ambassador, Carlton J. H. Hayes.! A distinguished Columbia University history professor, Hayes had been in charge of the American embassy since the beginning of the year and had formed a rather positive impression of the Caudillo.2 To the relief of the Spanish government, Roosevelt assured Franco that the Allied landings in northwest Africa involved no infringement ofSpain's territorial sovereignty at any point, concluding with the categorical assurance "Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations," as he titled the dis1 . C. J. H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain (New York, 1946), 89-91. 2. "The General, I soon perceived, differed notably from the caricatures of him current in the 'leftist' press ofthe United States. Physically he was not so short or so stout and he did not 'strut.' Mentally he impressed me as being not at all a stupid or 'me too' sort of person, but distinctly alert and possessing a good deal of both determination and caution and a rather lively and spontaneous sense of humor. He laughed easily and naturally, which, I imagine, a Hitler couldn't do and a Mussolini wouldn't do except in private." Ibid., 30. 313 314 III. The Dictadura, 1939-1959 parate anti-German coalition. The British government offered similar assurances , and Franco would later refer to this as his first guarantee that, if worst came to worst, his regime could survive the possible defeat of the Axis. A new alarm was sounded at the cabinet meeting held on November 16, which was presented a report from the embassy in Berlin indicating that Hitler soon intended to request permission for the passage of troops across Spanish territory.3 The Germanophile minority (Asensio, Arrese, Gir6n) apparently urged closer alignment with the Third Reich, but the majority supported the position of Franco and Jordana in favor of continued nonbelligerence.4 The cabinet agreed that the entry of German troops had to be resisted, and on November 18 the Generalissimo ordered a partial mobilization 5 that for several months more than doubled the number oftroops under arms. The gesture was not ineffective, reinforcing the impression in Hitler's mind that movement into the peninsula would not be worth the effort and would encounter stout resistance from the Spanish, who he had once said were the only Latins who would fight. 6 Before the end ofthe month Spanish ambassadors around the world were informed of the government's firm decision to resist any foreign occupation ofthe Balearics-a move reportedly under consideration by both the Allies and the Axis. At the same time that measures were taken to safeguard Spain's territorial integrity, every effort was made to avoid incidents with the Anglo-American forces in Morocco and to maintain German good will by expediting the shipment ofstrategic raw materials and doing nothing to curb Nazi influence in the Spanish press. During the autumn of 1942 German schemes to engineer political change in Spain continued. The main contact was not the ambassador, von Stohrer, who was reserved for official diplomatic activities, but the Nazi party official and embassy counsellor Erich Gardemann. Since the beginning of the year the latter had held conversations with Arrese and Manuel 3. The German command developed two different contingency plans to counter a possible British (and later Anglo-American) landing in the Iberian peninsula. The first, Operation Isabella, prepared in May 1941, was the more ambitious, aimed not merely at driving any British forces out ofthe peninsula but at the capture of Gibraltar as well. One year later this was replaced by Operation Ilona, more modest in scope, aimed simply at countering an Anglo-American invasion and holding the north Spanish ports to protect the German position in France. (The code name changed from Ilona to Gisela in September 1942 following...

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