The Franco Regime, 1936–1975

13. The "German Phase," 1940–1942

The "German Phase," 1940-1942 Hitler's startling conquest of France in the spring of 1940 drastically altered the foreign policy of the Spanish regime. Its orientation had always been pro-German, but the terms on which the war had begun, and the uncertain prospects in the early months, had inevitably dictated a policy of neutrality. Germany's sudden ascendancy changed that, opening a new period of temptation combined with danger for both Spain and its government . The pro-German alignment that Franco adopted was nonetheless characterized by his customary prudence and indirection and stopped short of outright belligerence. It also had implications for domestic politics , arguing for some the logic ofa more strongly Falangist regime. In the end, Franco avoided both direct entry into the war and greater internal fascistization, but the policy of cautious opportunism and diplomatic zigzagging that ensued earned his government the enmity of both Nazi Germany and the western Allies. Though it managed to spare the people of Spain the horrors of involvement in World War II, it failed to make the most of Spain's status as a neutral power. By June 1940 most political and military opinion in Spain had swung sharply in the direction of Germany. The goal of a new Spanish "empire" had always been part ofthe Falangist program, even though it had usually been expressed in cautious and nonaggressive, almost metaphysical, terms. 1 Franco's new state had proclaimed the mission ofempire with vigor, 1. The FET's official statement, El imperio de Espana (Valladolid, 1938), had declared self-righteously that Spanish "imperialism is not going to be an imperialism ofpetroleum or rubber." Its task was to restore and lead pan-Hispanic unity and to achieve a "new Catholicity .... Spain aspires to the effective exercise of rights of defense and tutelage, ... not the rights of protectorates but the rights of defense of Spanish civilization in the world." 266 The "German Phase" 267 albeit in rather abstract formulae, and its social pronouncements during the early years sometimes echoed the Italian Fascist emphasis on a high birth rate for future military manpower. This aimed not only at overcoming international dependency through autarchist economic development, but also at regaining Gibraltar from Britain and possibly expanding the modest Spanish possessions in northwest Africa at the expense ofFrance. After the fall of France the attitude of most ofthe military hierarchy had changed in favor of getting in on the winning side, and Falangists were more ardent than ever in public expressions of Germanophilia.2 Franco was now firmly convinced of German victory and would remain so, though in diminishing degree, until mid-1944. Yet, though eager to adjust Spanish policy to the new situation, he did not abandon his habitual caution. On June 3, he prepared the text of a letter to Hitler (that would not be delivered for more than a week) congratulating him on the German victory and identifying Spain with the German cause, which he chose to define on this occasion as a continuation of the struggle against the same enemies whom the Spanish Nationalists had already fought. At the same time he detailed the economic and military deficiencies that made it difficult for Spain to enter the war at that time.3 The next day Beigbeder handed the German ambassador a list of Spanish claims in northwest Africa. On June 9, the eve ofItaly's attack on France, Mussolini urged Franco to join him, but the Caudillo, sensing the frustration that might attend Italian and Spanish participation as long as France and Britain were still resisting, politely declined in a cordial response.4 The Spanish regime nonetheless continued to feel especially close to Mussolini's government, which it considered its own representative within the Italo-German Axis. Ciano, who had established a close rapport with Serrano Suiier, requested him to convince Franco that even if Spain could not enter the war for the moment it should demonstrate solidarity with the Axis by altering its position of neutrality to a declaration of nonbelligerence .5 Franco agreed immediately, and Madrid declared its new policy of nonbelligerence on June 12. In a subsequent phase of weakened Axis power, Franco would insist that this merely expressed Spain's sympathy for Germany without chang2 . It might be noted that a relative Germanophilia has been characteristic of modern Spanish attitudes. A postwar study, Alfonso Alvarez Villar's "Notas sobre la germanofilia en Espana," in the Revista de Psicologia General y Aplicada, (1963), 1147-53, reported results ofan...