The Franco Regime, 1936–1975

8. The Nationalist War Effort

The Nationalist War Effort The initial odds in the Civil War scarcely favored the Nationalists. Not only had Mola's plan for a quick seizure ofthe capital been foiled, but the Popular Front dominated most ofthe larger cities, all the industrial areas, most of Spain's financial resources, most of the existing stock of military materiel, and the bulk of the Navy and Air Force. Moreover, the political militias formed by the revolutionary organizations at first considerably outnumbered the military auxiliaries of the Nationalists. Greater parity existed in the division of regular Army forces, though exact estimates have differed considerably.1 It will never be possible to arrive at precise totals, first ofall because there are not complete records, and secondly because of the inaccuracy or misleading character of records that do exist. The Army was not at full strength when the conflict began, because of incomplete recruitment and even more because at least onethird of the nominal 180,000 troops under arms were on summer leave. As far as can be determined, existing Army forces divided about equally 1. The most careful estimates will be found in Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular de la Republica (Madrid, 1973), 1: 181-210, and Los datos exactos de la Guerra Civil (Madrid, 1980), 55-94; Michael Alpert, El Ejercito Republicano en la Guerra Civil (Barcelona, 1977), 23-37; and Ricardo de la Cierva, "The Nationalist Army in the Spanish Civil War,"' in R. Carr, ed., The Spanish Republic and Civil War (London, 1971), 188-212. For an overview ofthe war, the best general account is Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 2nd ed., rev. and expo (New York, 1977). The best Spanish accounts are Ricardo de la Cierva, Historia ilustrada de la Guerra Civil espanola, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1970), favorable to the right; and M. TUlion de Lara et aI., La Guerra Civil espanola 50 anos despues (Barcelona , 1985), favorable to the left. See also Guillermo Cabanellas, La guerra de los mil dias, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1973); and Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Sintesis hist6rica de La Guerra de Liberaci6n 1936-1939 (Madrid, 1968), a one-volume Nationalist military account. There are a variety of memoirs by Nationalist veterans. Among the more notable are Jorge Vigon Suerodiaz, Cuadernos de guerra y notas de paz (Oviedo, 1970); and Jose Ma. Garate Cordoba, Mil dias de fuego (Barcelona, 1972). 120 The Nationalist War Effort 121 Republican troops during the first months of the Civil War between Republicans and Nationalists-around 55,000 for each side, though the actual available manpower may well have been less than that in both cases. Moreover, the Republicans retained the services of at least 60 percent of the 5,300 Air Force personnel, nearly two-thirds of the 20,000 Navy personnel (though minus many of their officers, slaughtered by crewmen in the first days), and slightly more than half of the armed police. Thus the Republican forces began with a slight numerical advantage in organized personnel, in addition to general air and naval control. This nominal advantage was, however, soon eroded by the effects of the revolution, which was determined to destroy the remains of the regular armed forces and replace them with political militia. Thus during the first weeks of the Civil War those military units remaining in the Republican zone were progressively dissolved by the revolution until few remained. Of the slightly more than 15,000 officers in the Spanish Army in 1936, at least halffound themselves in the Republican zone. Only a small minority of these rebelled during the weekend ofJuly 18, but approximately 3,000 were purged during the next few weeks. Some 1,500 were sooner or later executed and the remainder imprisoned. Another thousand or so managed either to flee the Republican zone or find hiding within it, while approximately 3,500 served the Republican forces during the Civil War. The result was the replacement of the regular Army in the Republican 122 II. The Civil War, 1936-1939 zone during late July and August with a series of revolutionary militia units and columns that relied mainly on political volunteers although integrating some loyal regular troops and police. Even those Army officers clearly loyal to the Republic were rarely trusted, and consequently the new revolutionary militia lacked training and discipline. Its military value was extremely low. 2 Thus the first major advantage enjoyed by the Nationalists lay...