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13 STORM CLEANUP AND A NEW STORM President Bush the elder, succeeding President Reagan in January 1989, was in the di‹cult position of not only following a popular president but also having to clean up the debt burden his predecessor had created. Reagan had cut federal taxes but, after his bargain with House Speaker O’Neill, had not cut federal spending accordingly. As a result, in his eight-year presidential tenure he generated more debt than had been accumulated by all prior American administrations.Reagan had played the role of the charming uncle,staying with his family for an extended visit during which he regularly brought home gifts and treated the family to expensive vacations and meals. Bush found himself playing the sober nephew who,after the uncle’s departure,discovered that all the largesse had been charged to the family credit card. Bush’s four-year presidency thus was doomed,at the outset,to being one of storm cleanup. Yet, during the campaign he had repeated, “Read my lips: No new taxes.” He soon found himself having to renege on the pledge.This, in turn, enraged devotees of Reaganomics who believed in cutting taxes no matter what the surrounding economic situation.Deficit reduction was made even more di‹cult by Bush’s decision to intervene militarily to block Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which, it was anticipated, might extend to an invasion of Saudi Arabia. The U.S. had an ambivalent relationship with Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein. No one contested the fact that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant and a rascal. But he did seem to fit the description President Franklin Roosevelt had for Latin American dictators of comparable character:“They may be SOBs. But they are our SOBs.” The greater threat in the region, in the 1980s, seemed to be the theocratic government of Iran, which was actively hostile toward the United States and was underwriting terrorist groups in the Middle East. Thus the U.S. had provided weapons and other assistance to Saddam during his bitter eight-year (1980–88) war with Iran,which resulted in at least a million casualties in the two countries. Saddam’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however—and the threat to 204 next-door Saudi Arabia—could not be tolerated.Both countries were closely tied to the United States; both were major sources of oil for Western and Asian markets. The question for American policymakers was how best to force Saddam’s withdrawal from Kuwait:by use of direct military force,preferably multilateral;or through a blockade and embargo which would take longer, but in time would strangle the Iraqi economy and force Saddam to back down. Most congressional Democrats, chastened by the American experience in Vietnam, leaned toward the isolation strategy—at least until it proved unworkable.Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and I shared the view.We had remained close following our work together at the State Department and the Center for National Policy,andVance often used an o‹ce in my consulting firm inWashington when he was visiting from NewYork.Vance’s public image was that of a straight-laced establishmentarian, but in private he was personally warm and generous. He greatly enjoyed chatting on the telephone and exchanging tidbits of Washington and New York gossip. He was devoted to his family. I would help him periodically with drafts of speeches and articles. Characteristically, he always would suggest that any articles include both of our bylines. But I was able to convince him that an article bearing only his byline,as former secretary of state,would be more eªective in influencing opinion . I could write my own articles with my own byline. We both became active in supporting the embargo/isolation strategy toward Iraq.Vance articles advocating the approach appeared in several daily newspapers. I helped with drafting of testimony that he delivered to both Senate and House committees. Then, as a vote on the issue approached in the Senate,we called on key Democratic senators together and provided them with a white paper (which Bob Hunter had also helped to write),setting forth both the strategic and legal bases for the isolation strategy. On the eve of the Senate vote, Senator Al Gore Jr. remained undecided on the issue. He flew from Tennessee in time to meet us for breakfast in the Senate dining room before casting his vote later that day. His aide, Leon Fuerth, accompanied him. Gore’s...

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