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37 Chapter 3 Weserübung Peace Mediation Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and three days later the United Kingdom declared war on Germany. The United Kingdom, however , was not prepared to go to war on Polish soil, leading to the “Phony War,” a pause in hostilities that would last over seven months. The bishop of Oslo was one of many who saw an opening and threw themselves into mediating a peace settlement. Berggrav knew that he could use the ecumenical movement as a platform to promote reconciliation, but he faced a problem: as long as there was no reconciliation within his own church, he had no credibility attempting to reconcile the warring powers. This was another idea from the Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State: the church had to embody the qualities on which it called the world to account.1 It occurred to him that an appeal co-signed with Hallesby would be a dramatic gesture. Berggrav and Hallesby had seen each other only once in the last dozen years, exiting and entering an Oslo streetcar.2 Convinced that Berggrav was a theological liberal, Hallesby had famously declared in 1937 that until the new bishop of Oslo renounced his liberal past and unconditionally confessed the church’s creed, “we shall pray.”3 Berggrav himself was reticent about placing himself in any camp, but his general mindset was certainly liberal. After consulting trusted colleagues, he set aside his apprehension at meeting his most severe critic and telephoned Hallesby with 38 · Invasion, Accommodation, Collaboration his proposal. To Berggrav’s surprise, Hallesby agreed. On 6 September 1939, “God’s Call to Us Now” appeared in major Scandinavian newspapers . It appealed for calm, responsibility, prayer, solidarity with both sides, and peace.4 “God’s Call to Us Now” had immediate consequences. Leading Norwegians urged Berggrav to make a last-ditch effort to prevent war, and he threw himself into a round of Scandinavian and ecumenical peace initiatives between Holland, Berlin, and London that would not end until 31 January 1940. In the course of his personal diplomacy, he met and took the measure of both the English foreign minister, Viscount Halifax (Edward F. L. Wood), and Hitler’s designated successor and commander-in-chief of the German Air Force, Hermann Göring. His efforts over several months ended in failure, because, in his judgment, neither side trusted the other.5 Berggrav did make a final trip to Berlin on 18 March, a last ditch effort at the urging of an English businessman, reputedly with close ties to the British Foreign Office, and the Swedish foreign minister, Christian Günther. The plan was unrealistic and the mission was utopian, but it was a measure of the desperation to avoid war. Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini were already meeting at the Brenner Pass, and, as Günther put it to Berggrav, “Go! The time is 10 minutes to 12.” In Berlin, Berggrav met with Secretary of State Ernst von Weizsäcker, who told him that not much could be done to prevent war. The doomsday clock was in fact at five minutes to twelve, but they scheduled another meeting at von Weizsäcker’s home. The diplomat arrived late, his face ashen. Once they were alone, he leaned forward, as if about to fall, and burst out, “There’s going to be war! War! War!” The scene, wrote Berggrav, was “overwhelming.”6 He flew back to Oslo thinking it must be midnight. But it was not quite midnight, and in Oslo Berggrav faced unfinished business. On 30 November 1939, the Soviet Union had invaded Finland, starting the so-called “Winter War.” The Finns had fought with extraordinary bravery and initial success, and the Norwegian public felt deep solidarity with their Scandinavian neighbors. More than 700 men volunteered to fight the Russians, the public contributed generous stocks of food and supplies, and there were numerous calls for the government to provide military aid. The government, however, was cautious. It faced neutrality violations Weserübung · 39 by both Germany and the United Kingdom and wanted to avoid being drawn into war. Military aid to Finland could lead to a Soviet alliance with Germany against Norway and the Allies, a possibility that Britain and France also feared. The government thus offered only token military aid to Finland, vetoed a possible transit of French and British troops through Norway to Finland, and interned Finns who strayed across the border.7 The government of Sweden made...

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