Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control

9. Conclusions

Conclusions Multilateral regimes can contain the spread ofdeadly technologies in two general ways. First, they can pursue a technological containment approachan approach ofcontaining strategic weapons proliferation through technological means, by denying regional powers the technological assistance required for weapons development. Second, regimes may adopt a political-legal approach, whereby all concerned states verifiably renounce certain weapons or the military use ofa technology. Such agreements may allow technology transfer between states (or not actively oppose such transfer) on the condition that the transferred technology would be used only for peaceful nonmilitary applications. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) pursued the former approach. How effective is the MTCR? How effective is the technological containment approach? What broader foreign policy lessons does the MTCR experience offer? The first question was addressed in Chapters 3-8. The MTCR was evaluated as being partly effective, and generally necessary but rarely sufficient, as a nonproliferation tool. The regime's technology barriers mainly delayed and raised the costs oftarget missile programs, which caused missile decisions to shift from technological to political considerations. These political considerations-related to security pressures from the regional environment, political-economic pressures from the global system, and foreign policies of engagement with regional powers in such a system-determined national missile outcomes. On policy grounds, this analysis suggested that the easing of regional tensions and international engagement with regional powers could at least temporarily curb missile proliferation. It also suggested that in the long term, a better constructed treaty regime that can withstandpolitical fluctuations would provide valuable additional barriers against proliferation. Steps toward such a regime were outlined in Chapter 8. A critical examination ofhow technological, security, and political-economic pressures influenced national missile decisions provides answers to our second 182 CONCLUSIONS 183 and third questions. How well can multilateral regimes and unilateral approaches, engagement and containment policies toward target states, and the use of technological , economic, and political instruments, contain strategic weapons proliferation ? Under what conditions are these policies successful, and when do they fall short? These questions are examined in this chapter. THE POLITICS OF REGIMES How was cooperation secured in the MTCR? How can it more generally be attained in supplier cartels and multilateral security regimes? The literature on cooperation is extensive and notes that the interaction between power, interests, and knowledge, along with the use of incentives, affect cooperation. These factors have sustained multilateral cooperation in the MTCR. The experience ofthe missile regime was that, in the I980s, increasing knowledge about the perils ofmissile proliferation and the links between nuclear and missile proliferation created an interest in a regime to contain the missile threat. Over time, this knowledge and interest spread beyond the G-7 to other suppliers, who alsojoined the MTCR. But when states were reluctant to comply fully with the MTCR, in part because of conflicting economic interests to export missile technologies, power politics came into play. U.S. power (through sanctions and incentives) brought reluctant supplier states more firmly into the MTCR. The effect of sanctions, however , should not be exaggerated. As noted in Chapter 3, some MTcR-related sanctions (such as those against North Korea) had no effect, while other sanctions (such as those against Russian and Chinese firms) only partially and indirectly restrained technology transfers. In some of these cases, the incentive to lift or not impose sanctions induced compliance. The role of incentives in international cooperation is worth further examination . Because of their high transaction costs, incentives may be difficult to offer, but when they are viable, they can consolidate cooperation. [ Incentives made key suppliers such as Russia and China cooperate better with the MTCR. Political and security considerations (such as the benefits of improved ties with the United States), as well as increasing acceptance of nonproliferation norms, influenced Moscow and Beijing to more strongly curb their firms' technology transfers. But economic incentives consolidated their restraint from these transfers . In the I990s, Moscow and Beijing benefited economically from lucrative U.S. space contracts (worth a billion dollars over a decade) in exchange for curbing relatively low-income rocket and space exports to regional powers (the Russia-India cryogenic deal was valued at $200 to 300 million, and Scud type exports were worth similar small amounts). Moreover, these incentive structures were largely market-conforming, because they were perpetuated by economic forces such as the steady global demand for 184 CONCLUSIONS satellite launches but reduced space activity among regional powers. If incentive structures...