Common Sense on Weapons of Mass Destruction

Foreword

Foreword I c o m m e n d a m b a s s a d o r g r a h a m f o r w r i t i n g this much-needed book. Nuclear weapons in the hands of “rogue” states or terrorist organizations represent the principal security threat to the United States and to the world community today. The aftermath of the Cold War has in many ways left us less secure, given the large numbers of unnecessary and dangerous nuclear weapons, the enormous stockpiles of nuclear bomb material in Russia and elsewhere, and the spread of other types of weapons of mass destruction. It is to nuclear weapons that we must turn our principal attention—only they can cripple civilization as we know it. Our principal bulwark against the threat represented by the current number and potential proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt). Some argue that the npt has failed and has become irrelevant, and that the only counter to nuclear proliferation is unilateral force—a course which history tells us is counterproductive at best, and probably v i i disastrous. But the npt regime has not failed. Only two more countries have nuclear weapons now than had them in 1970 when the npt entered into force. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that sixty to seventy countries are now capable of building nuclear weapons. Should a substantial number of states act on this capability (as was predicted years ago before the npt was signed), it would create a world far different from the one that we have now, and one that it is difficult even to contemplate . It would be a world in which the stability of civilization would continually remain in the balance. But this can be avoided and nuclear nonproliferation policies can continue to prevail if the npt regime is strictly observed by all states—this means by all states, including the five nuclear weapon states: the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China. The npt was created in 1970 on the basis of a mutual commitment , expressed in Article 6 of the treaty, that in exchange for the rest of the world agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons, the five nuclear weapon states would engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at eventually eliminating nuclear weapons and would share peaceful nuclear technology. When the npt was made permanent in 1995, this commitment was refined to make clear that it included deep reductions leading toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and support for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It also meant strict observance of the promises by the nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear npt parties. The npt nonnuclear weapon states (now numbering 182) have always been skeptical about npt compliance by the nuclear weapon states, and they are presently far more skeptical as a result of the United States backing away from treaty commitments in recent years. It is correct to emphasize the importance of compliance with the npt regime as the White House has done. Actions are urgently needed v i i i / f o r e w o r d to ensure the long-term viability of the npt, which is absolutely essential to peace and security in the twenty-first century. I suggest we proceed along the following lines: If the npt nuclear weapon states would agree to a plan whereby truly drastic reductions in nuclear weapons would be achieved over a period of years, then the Security Council could agree that any breach of the nonnuclear status of any of the 182 npt nonnuclear weapon states would be regarded as a breach of the peace, with the council agreeing in advance that if it should determine that proliferation had taken place, “all necessary means” (including conventional military force) would be authorized to correct the situation. As part of this, all of the states possessing nuclear weapons would be required to declare in a submission to the council their number and type. Then the United States and Russia could agree to a very low residual level of nuclear weapons in the range of 50 to 100 each, with Britain, France, and China reducing to a level just above elimination. In return for eliminating their nuclear weapon programs, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea would receive from the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China) legally binding...