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1. Introduction: Serbia as a Dysfunctional State
- University of Washington Press
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1 INTRODUCTION Serbia as a Dysfunctional State VJERAN PAVLAKOVI– “To live without Milopevi_ is a feeling that spreads slowly, that enters the veins slowly, very slowly. . . . Tired, I salute the Revolution and devote myself to a bottle of 1997 Chardonnay. I o‹cially close the chapter of my life of these thirteen years and try to begin to be normal.”—PETAR LUKOVI–, journalist in Belgrade1 S ince 1989, Serbia has transformed from the largest republic of Eastern Europe’s most liberal country to an impoverished, barely functioning state, still in the process of disintegration and rife with numerous political, economic, and social problems. All the problems of the last thirteen years cannot be placed at the feet of one man, but the regime and political system that emerged under Slobodan Milopevi_ can certainly be held accountable for the situation in which Serbia, one of two republics left in the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, finds itself in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The stagnation of Yugoslavia’s communist system , economic crises, the political upheavals in Europe at the end of the 1980s, and resurgent nationalism throughout the six Yugoslav republics all contributed to the catastrophe which engulfed Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Rather than choosing to pursue further democratization and economic liberalization, Yugoslavia’s leaders, and especially Milopevi_, opted for the doctrine of collective rights as strategies of political mobilization. Like his counterparts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovi_, Milopevi_ used nationalism to attain, and then preserve, political power. His reign was authoritarian, yet maintained a facade of democracy. The regime retained the symbols and rhetoric of the Left but courted the extreme Right and stoked the fires of national hatred. The economic system appeared to be a chaotic mix of socialism, self-management, and capitalism, although the mafiazation of the economic sector made these terms meaningless. The chapters of this book seek to trace the transformation of Serbia (and more broadly the Yugoslav federation) from the twilight of the communist era to what it has become today: a dysfunctional state. Each of the chapters delves into the details of what a dysfunctional state actually is. The rule of Milopevi_ and his Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) lacked political and moral legitimacy, relying instead on the power of symbols and a seemingly endless series of conflicts to preserve his leadership. The system was also intended to maintain the power of Serbia’s political and economic elite, as long as they proved useful to Milopevi_ and his wife, Mirjana Markovi_. The ruling family’s control over the Serbian economy led to the pauperization of society and created social problems which will continue to be felt for years to come. The dysfunctionality of the state is even more apparent in the further disintegration of the state itself, not only in the physical removal of territories from Belgrade’s control (such as Kosovo) but also in the inability of the FRY’s leadership to agree on the future structure of any joint state. Chapter 2, “Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milopevi_ Era and After,” outlines the leading political trends in Serbia from the consolidation of power by Milopevi_ until his downfall. Despite his eventual removal by the will of the people, the Milopevi_ regime was for the most part successful in perpetuating its control over the Serbian political establishment . Apart from the personal charismatic leadership skills of Milopevi_ himself, the relative longevity of a government which lost four successive wars was due to the control of both symbolic (nationalist intellectuals, traditional and communist myths, the Serbian Orthodox Church) and concrete (the media, economic infrastructure, the army, regular and secret police) levers of power. As a communist apparatchik, Milopevi_ was initially wary of the Memorandum drafted by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) in 1986, but following his experience with the Kosovo Serbs in 1987, he realized there was a significant base of support among influential Serbian intellectuals for the nationalist project. Serbian nationalist myths, from the Kosovo epic of 1389 to the Partisan victory of World War Two, were employed to realize the project of essentially creating a Greater Serbian state. Thus the symbols of the Chetniks, while not used directly by the regime, were tolerated and even co-opted as strategies of political survival, since the ideologies of both the extreme Left and Right envisioned an expanded, and centralized, Serbian state. VJERAN PAVLAKOVI– 4 [54.234.233.157] Project MUSE (2024...