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:GHAPTER SEVEN THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY heABM Treaty from SALT I, unlike the Interim Agreement, is an agreement of indefinite duration. It originally limited strategic defense systems and components in ABM deployment areas to two sites for each party. For the purposes of the treaty, the three current ABM components are listed as ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles, and ABM radars. Article III limits the number of ABM interceptor missile launchers to 100 per site and a total of 200 for each party. It contains strict limits on the ABM radars deployed at each site. One site may be located to defend the national capital and one may be located to defend one ICBM deployment area. The two sites must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart to prevent them from having overlapping coverage that could create a base for a national or territorial defense. Article I of the ABM Treaty enumerates the object and purpose of the treaty by including the fundamental obligation not to create an ABM defense of the national territory or the base for such·a defense. The creation of an ABM defense of a region is prohibited except for such deployment as permitted by Article III. Agreed Statement D provides that if fixed land-based ABM systems or their components based on future technology or "other physical principles" (not defined in the treaty) such as lasers or particle beams should be created in the future, such systems or components cannot be deployed absent amendment of the treaty. Article IV provides an exception to the deployment limitations of Article III for ABM launchers and ABM radars for the purpose of testing an ABM system or its components at ABM test ranges. Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components that are not fixed landbased (i.e., sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based). This sweeping prohibition on ABM systems or components except fixed landbased is designed to reinforce the objectives of Article I. Further to this same objective are two constraints in Article VI. One prohibits the upgrade, or improvement, of air defense or theater mis- sile defense systems to ABM capability. The second, in conjunction with another Agreed Statement applicable to the deployment of large phased array radars (then the relevant modern technology), covers radars that are not ABM radars, but that are deployed in the future for the purpose of early warning of ballistic missile attack (as opposed to an ABM role of directing missiles to intercept the incoming weapons). They must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward so as not to contribute to the creation of a base for a nationwide defense by means of the location of large ABM-capable radars throughout the country. This provision was the subject of a much-discussed Soviet violation when a large phased array radar with the characteristics of an early-warning radar began to be constructed near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. It was neither located on the periphery nor oriented outward. After years of argument the Soviet Union finally agreed to dismantle the radar. Allegedly it was to be converted into a shoe factory. The objective of the ABM Treaty, in essence, is to prohibit the deployment of large-scale ABM strategic defense, thus making each party a hostage of the other. This concept is known as assured destruction or mutual assured destruction, often referred to as MAD. Each party to the ABM Treaty assures the other side of the effectiveness of its deterrent. If one side were to build up strategic defense, the other side might have to increase its strategic offensive weapons to overcome the defense. Further, the building up of strategic defense could be seen by the other side as an attempt to gain a first-strike capability, with defensive systems deployed to blunt a retaliatory second strike, thereby adding to instability. By keeping strategic defense at a low level the ABM Treaty therefore establishes the basis for reductions and reinforces strategic stability. It is accurately referred to as a "cornerstone of strategic arms control" and plays as important a role today as in I972, a fact recognized by President Clinton in his September I, 2000, speech announcing the deferral of any plans to announce the authorization of deployment of a national missile defense. The ABM Treaty was amended in I974 by a protocol reducing the two permitted deployment areas for each party to one...

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