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10 / Patterns of Sino-Iranian Relations partner or rival? A mericans coming to Iran-China relations in the early twenty-first centurywillprobablyaskthequestion,IsChinaapartnerof theUnited States in the maintenance of the global order, or is it a rival of the United States seeking to establish a new, alternative world order? Does China cooperate with the United States in key policy areas involving Iran and the Middle East, or does it oppose u.s. eªorts in that region in tandem with the iri? Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a simple answer. China is both a partner and a rival of the United States. At times it has cooperated with the United States in ways contrary to Iranian policy. At other times, it has cooperated with Iran in ways contrary to u.s. policy. Perhaps one-armed political scientists are no more common than one-armed economists.1 Beijing has cooperated with Washington in many areas. During the IranIraq war, Beijing consistently urged Tehran to end the war. It urged Tehran to avoid military confrontation with the United States in 1987–88. It urged Tehran to accept Security Council Resolution 598 with its cease-fire and u.n.sponsored peace talks. In all, Beijing played a significant role in ending the Iran-Iraq war. Beijing complied with u.s. demands in 1987 to end the sale of Silkworm antiship missiles and seems to have persuaded Tehran to desist from using already delivered Silkworms against u.s.-protected Gulf commerce. A decade later Beijing agreed to halt sale of C-801 and C-802 and other antiship missiles to Iran. It also agreed with Washington not to sell Iran Category I ballistic missiles and then accepted a somewhat broader definition of prohibited missile cooperation. Beijing supported the late 1990 u.n. eªort to 281 compel Iraq via sanctions to withdraw from Kuwait and did not veto the crucial Security Council vote authorizing use of force in that eªort. Beijing suspended nuclear cooperation with the iri in response to u.s. demands, and urged Tehran to cooperate with the iaea regarding Iran’s nuclear programs. This was part of a larger Chinese embrace of the global npt regime and a decision to uphold that regime in tandem with the United States. Beijing also rejected Iranian urging that China keep Israel at arm’s length or that it use its Security Council seat to oust Israel from the General Assembly and otherwise “uphold Palestinian rights.” Beijing played a role in teaching the iri the costs of violating interstate norms about engaging foreign Muslim communities in violation of the laws of other states. Beijing also declined Tehran’s repeated invitations to form one or another type of united front against u.s. hegemony. But Beijing’s opposition to u.s. policy in cooperation with the iri has been equally robust. Beijing consistently rejected and thwarted u.s. eªorts to sanction the iri. During the Iran-Iraq war, Beijing rejected Operation Staunch and served as Iran’s major arms supplier. During the postwar period, Beijingrejectedu.s. dualcontainmentpolicyandpursuedeconomicandtechnological cooperation with Iran. While u.s. policy sought to contain the iri, Chinese policy sought expanded economic and political cooperation with the iri. Beijing helped Tehran circumvent u.s. eªorts to deny Iran access to advanced,militarilyrelevanttechnologyandconsistentlysuppliedthe iri with dual-use technology and machinery applicable to missile, advanced conventional weapons, and chemical warfare programs. China has been a major partner of Iran in its military modernization eªorts, including especially the development of capabilities targeting u.s. air and naval forces. Beijing has rejected u.s. eªorts to hobble iri energy development and assisted with the Nekaterminalinthecros scheme,long-termlng purchases,andjointdevelopment of the Yadavaran oil field. During the lead-ups to both the 1991 and 2003 wars against Iraq, Beijing cooperated with iri peace diplomacy intended to avert those u.s.-led military campaigns. Beijing has rejected, in tandem with Tehran, the u.s. policy of u.s. military forces serving as guardian of the Gulf and upheld, instead, the role of “littoral states” in that regard. This implicitly assigns a major role to the iri in contradiction to the u.s. eªort torestricttheiri role.Fortwelveyears,Chinaservedastheiri’smajornuclear partner, playing a major role in development of iri nuclear capabilities. During 2004 Beijing opposed u.s. eªorts to have the iri nuclear issue transferred from the iaea to the Security Council. Chinese diplomacy often embraced antihegemony and pro-multipolarity...

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