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8 TheIslamicRepublic There are numerous detailed accounts of the actual transfer of political power following the Islamic Revolution of 1978–79, so it is not necessary to recount this material. Here, the concern is the state’s use of religious symbolism to promote its own legitimacy following the 1978–79 revolution. In relation to the transfer of power, it is sufficient for these purposes to keep in mind that the revolution, the roots of which went back for years or even decades, culminated in a massive movement including diverse groups with divergent ideological perspectives that shared little more than the desire to overthrow the shah. Once this basic common goal was achieved, these groups were not as united in purpose as they had been prior to the revolution itself. Unlike other groups, leaders, and ideological camps, Khomeini and the revolutionary religious leadership who supported him were able to sustain their movement on a large scale beyond the revolution itself and thereby succeeded in taking over the state apparatus. The effective use of Shiªi symbolism by the religious leadership surrounding Khomeini was a critically important factor in its success in taking over the state apparatus. Upon taking power in 1979, Khomeini and his followers set out to consolidate their authority and to build a new government modeled on an abstract vision of Islamic government as articulated by Khomeini himself in his construction of the doctrine of “rule of the jurist consult ” (velayat-e faqih). Shiªi symbols and rituals were central to this process. Just as Shiªi symbols and rituals had been used in the 1960s and 1970s to mobilize the masses to overthrow the shah, they were now used to construct a vision of the state and its place in the international political order. This role was articulated as being the defender of the oppressed masses of the world from imperialist domination and oppression. While this was clearly understood as an Islamic movement, it was allowed to extend to non-Muslims in certain ways. 131 Upon taking power, the revolutionaries were initially focused upon exporting the revolution and leading an Islamic, or even a “third worldist ,” revolution. However, while the Islamic revolution was extremely influential in other countries, it did not lead to a series of similar Islamic revolutions. The leaders of the Islamic revolution believed that their ideology was universalistic in some ways. However, on a more practical level it functioned at a national level. Iran was not only the center and starting point of the revolution, it was increasingly virtually the only place where the ideals were implemented. Furthermore, Iranian nationalism was not fundamentally subverted by the revolutionary ideology. Rather, it was recast in a new light, rejecting the more extreme secular tendencies of some forms of Iranian nationalism and inserting into it a revolutionary component.1 While the policies of the new regime were sometimes dictated by idealism, at other times they were governed by pragmatism. However, when it came to the religious rhetoric of the regime, the revolutionary Karbala Paradigm continued to be used in new forms throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The shah, the United States, Israel, and Iraq (and sometimes other nations) were equated with Yazid, and the Islamic revolutionary regime and its supporters with Hoseyn and his followers. Michael Fischer recounts how Khomeini, when faced with the possibility of direct U.S. military intervention in Iran, said that all Iranians were ready and willing to become martyrs just as Hoseyn and his followers had done at Karbala in 680.2 “Commanding the right and forbidding the wrong” continued to be a central dogma of the state. Numerous efforts at economic development and reconstruction were similarly referred to as jahad-e sazandegi, or “a sacred struggle for construction and development.” Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the themes of the revolution were kept alive by shifting the focus away from opposition to the Pahlavi regime and toward opposition to the two great superpowers on the international stage, the United States and the Soviet Union. This was not a new direction, for the revolutionaries had been targeting the United States and communism during the revolution itself. However, now slogans like “Neither East nor West,” which stressed Iran’s independence , became part and parcel of the revolutionary regime’s ideology , rhetoric, and policies. Hence, opposing the imperialist policies of the United States and the Soviet Union were portrayed as a jihad (religious struggle), and those killed in this endeavor were considered 132 TheIslamicRepublic...

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