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6/ The U.S. Visa Decision and Beijing's Reaction On 22May 1995 aWhite HousespokesmanannouncedthatPresident Lee Teng-hut would be given a visa to visit the United States as a private individual. Lee was permitted to enter the country to deliver an address at the spring commencement ceremony of Cornell University, where he had received his Ph.D. in agricultural econOlnics in 1968. Lee's visit would be the first by a Taiwan president since 1979. The visa decision, part of the process ofadJustment in u.s.-Taiwan relations that began in mid-I994, prompted China's leadership to decide on mllitary measures directed at Taiwan. Uke most important decisions, the u.s. decision to issue Lee Teng-hui a visa was complex. It can be analyzed in terms of the sentiments and calculations of the individual who had the ultimate power of decision, President BW Clinton; the institutional interests of the organizations making up the u.s. government and the political relationships among those institutions, particularly the peculiar institution of separation of powers; and organizational processes and miscommunications. BUI Clinton had warm feelings for Taiwan. As governor of Arkansas he had visited Taiwan four times promoting trade. He was treated as an honmed guest, as is Taipei's wont with visiting influential Americans, and witnessedfirst hand Taiwan'seconomic and politicalprogreSS.l Clinton 's few interactions with China's top leaders, on the other hand, had been strained. During his first meeting with president Jiang Zemin in Seattle in 1993, Jiang lectured Clinton for half an hour on the evils of u.s. interference in China's internal affairs. Speaking from notes, Jiang turned aside Clinton's efforts to direct the conversation along less hostile lines. Presidents are human beings and one cannotdismiss the poss!biUty that Clinton got a bit of personal satisfaction by saying "no" to Beijing on an issue as dose to its heart as Taiwan. He had, after all, little reason to be sympathetic to China and its leaders. Clinton's political interests were also served by ignoring Beijing's 67 68 The U.s. Visa Decision wishes over Taiwan. His reversal on MFN had been politically costly. By saying no to Beijing, Clinton strengthened his domestic political position . That was especially important after his party's devastating setback in the mid-term elections of November 1994, when, for the tirst time since 1948, Republicans seized control of both houses of Congress. The Republican Party was united and invigorated under the leadership of new House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and determined to use control of Congress to attack the Clinton White House, preparing the way for a full Republican takeover ofgovernment in November 1996. Clinton's standing In the polls was at a record low and many Democratic members of Congress welcomed opportunities to disassociate themselves from him. The Republican Congress attacked Clinton on many issues, including foreign policy, China policy, and, more particularly, Taiwan. On 2 May 1995 the House of Representatives voted 396to 0 in favor of a resolution urging the administration to issue a visa to Lee Teng-hul, allowing him to visit the United States as a private individual. During the debate over the resolution, several members indicated they would support legislation should the administration ignore the resolution. Congressional resolutions merely express the sentimentofCongress and are not legally binding on the president. Legislation, however, has the force of law. A week after the House vote, the Senate voted 91 to 1 in favor of a similar resolutlon.a It is important to note that those votes wer~ completely bipartisan. Republicans may have attacked Clinton on what they sensed was a popularissue, but Democrats disassociated themselves from an unpopular and ineffectual President. Both parties responded to strong popular sentiments synipathetic to Taiwan and negative toward China's leaders. Any u.s. president-and especially a weakened one such as Clinton after November 1994-must carefully pick his tights with Congress. He will avoid tights he is likely to lose, since a Congressional override ofhis veto will tar him as weak. If he chooses to take on a hostile majority in Congress, one of his few weapons is appeal to public opinion. This, however, requires taking a stance on a popular issue on which he is sure to have wide public support. That simply was not the case with denying Taiwan's president a visa because of Beijing's objections. Political ineptitude by the administration gave ready ammunition to Congressional critics ofits Taiwan policy. On...

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