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14 / Appraising the Gains and Costs of Beijing's Coercive Exercises Was Beijing's exercise of coercion successful? Did it achieve its objectives? If so, did the costs of those achievements justify the gains? In answering those questions we must be acutely aware of preestablished beliefs and values. Both the conclusions of China's leaders and their advisors and of American analysts are likely to be deeply colored by cognitive structures derived from emotions and beliefs associated with Taiwan. Yet it is important to attempt to sort out successes and failures, for this may determine Beijing's future management of the Taiwan question. Beijing clearly did not achieve its maximal objectives vis-a-vis either the United States or Taiwan. It did not persuade the United States to recognize that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Nor did it persuade Taipei to accept the "one country, two systems" doctrine. Just as clearly, Beijing did achieve its minimal objective vis-A-vis the United States: convincing U.s. leaders that transgression of PRC "principles" on Taiwan would be costly. Many u.s. leaders and analysts had believed that Beijing would not risk lIupsetting the apple cartl/ of economic benefits associated with proper Sino-u.s. relationsby fordng theTaiwan issue. Economic development was China's top priority, according to that view, and u.s. support for that goal was too important for Beijing to risk by forcing the Taiwan issue. As long as Washington or Taipei did not confront Beijing with some egregious loss of face, it was widely believed in the United States, China would not resort to military means to settle the Taiwan issue. After March 1996 such iJIusions were far less common. Most Americans were more willing to accept Beijing's oft.repeated assertion that no cost was too great to protect "sovereignty," meaning the PRC'S claim to Tai· wan. By bringing the United States face to face with the real possibility of military conflict with China, Beijing gave credibility to its warnings. In the future such warnings are less likely to be dismissed as rhetorical ripostes issued largely for reasons of Chinese internal politiCS. As Zhou Enlal said after Chinese forces intervened in Korea against the United 148 Appraising the Gains and Costs 149 States, in the future the United States would know that China meant what it said. Beijing also secw:ed significant modifications of u.s. policy in Beijing's favor. The United States explicitly promised not to support either independence for Taiwan or its membership in the UN. While there was no u.s. promise regarding future visits byTaiwan's president to the United States, such visits are likely to be extremely infrequent. More broadly, China gained increased status as a major power, as a major rival of the United States. It successfully confronted the United States militarily. From a position of material inferiority it stood its ground and achieved important political objectives. This success will strengthenarguments offuture militants who press for tough, confrontational tactics toward the United States and other countries. It is less clear whether Beijing achieved its minimal objective vis-a-vis Taiwan of compelling it to suspend "pragmatic diplomacy." Taipei is likely to be cautious in its post-crisis search for broader international recognition ofTaiwan's status as a state. In Taiwan, too, illusions about the constraining effects of economic interdependence were fairly common before the crisis. Taiwan investment and trade were so clearly mator factors fueling China's economic boom that many people believed Belling would not risk war with Taiwan. Especially among proindependence supporters of the DW, it was widely thought that Belling's threats to attack Taiwan were bluffs. Many DPP supporters beUeved that this bogus "threat" was used by the KMT to scare voters, thereby keeping itself in power and the DPP out. Since the Taiwan Strait criSis, the credibility of Beijing's threats has increased and may well reduce the popular appeal of bold moves to secure enhanced international recognition. Kuomintang politicians will have less electoral incentive to court votes through such moves. Against these gains for Beijing must be weighed the costs of achieving them, which were many and heavy. Regarding Sino-u.s. relations, the crisis led to a major modification in the u.s. policy of calculated ambiguity toward cross-Strait relations. From 1971 on, Washington had refused to say how it would react in the event ofconflict between the two sides of the Strait. That policy was designed to deter...

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