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11. PRC Strategy
- University of Washington Press
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11 I PRe Strategy If we assume. that in the Taiwan Strait crisis militaryinstruments were used to achieve political objectives, we must ask what objectives Beijing sought through its campaign of military coercion against Taiwan. Very probably that campaign had minimal and maximal objectives toward both Taiwan and the United States. Those can be outlined in table 1. The proximate target of Beijing's coercive exercises was the psychologyofthe people ofTaiwan. Beijinghoped to create a sense ofapprehension and fear in the minds of those people. War and all its suffering was imminentl The Chinese Communists were determined and prepared to attack regardless of costsl Perhaps they were not entirely rational! War had to be avoided by whatever means necessaryl Ifthat was not possible, then people should fend for their own families! Those were the sentiments Beijing hoped to cultivate. These mass fears would be both stimulated and focused by TaiWan's March 1996 electoral process. Agreat deal of excitement surrounded the elections, which people in Taiwan saw as a turning point for Taiwan and its relations with the United States, mainland China, and the world generally. There was a sense that history was being made. Beijing planned to convert this state of roused emotion and interest to fear through the exercise of military coercion. At a minimum, the electorate might swing away from Lee Teng-hul's war-threatening "Taiwan independence " and vote for more acceptable (to the co) New Party candidates . Taiwan's much-vaunted presidential elections might also be disrupted by pressure-induced instability. The atmosphere during the campaign period was certain to be tense even without Beijing's moves, as the stakes were high and partisan suspicions deep. Riots and politically inspired brawls were not an unusual part of Taiwanese politics even in the calmest times. Under heavy pressure, who knew what might happen? With luck there might be widespread panic and rioting, perhaps even leading to reimposed martial law or suspension of the scheduled presidential elections. 118 Minimal Objective Maximal Objective PRe Strategy Table 1 Minimal and Maximal PRC Objectives toward Taiwan and the United States TOWARD TAIWAN TOWARD THE u.s. Compel to suspend Convince transgressions 119 "pragmatic diplomacy" of PRC "principles" on Taiwan would be costly Compel to accept "one Persuade to recognize country, two systems" that Taiwan is part formula of thePRc Mass fear would have two positive consequences for PRC strategy. The first, socioeconomic instability, would manifest itself in heavy selling of Taiwan currency, stocks, and property; capital flight; hoarding of essential goods; purchasing of gold bullion; dispatching of families overseas; mass exodus from airports and harbors; riots; runs on banks; and other forms of panic. The second, political consequence would be action against Lee Teng-hui and the DPP, who were taking Taiwan into war. Such action could take many forms, such as votes for the New Party, which Beijing viewed as more reliably Chinese nationalist and more willing to repair relations with Beijing on the latter's terms. The threat of war might also politically activate Taiwan's military officer corps, who would have to bear the brunt of fighting against an overwhelmingly superior enemy and who did not, in many cases, care for Lee Teng-huj's departure from the "one China," anti·PRC principles of Chiang Kai-shek and ChiangChing-kuo. Under Chiang Kai-shekvirtually all military officers, especially high-ranking ones, were mainlanders, not native Taiwanese. Blatant discrimination against native Taiwanese declined under Chiang Ching-kuo, but for various cultural reasons military careers continued to be far more attractive to young people from mainlander families. Young Taiwanese were far more likely to choose industry, commerce, law, or education. Especially at the higher ranks of the officer corps, which were reached only after decades of service, individuals of mainlander background continued to predominate in the mid-1990s. Many of them-that is to say, a large part of Taiwan's officer corps-were unhappy with Lee Teng-hut's departure from the orthodoxies of the Chiang family. Beijing's strategists probably hoped that these [3.80.129.195] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 20:15 GMT) 120 PRe Strategy political tendendes would lead to divided loyalties and equivocation among Taiwan's military leadership. Analystsin the PRC with whom I talked in Beijing in mid·1995 stressed that Taiwan did not have a sense of nationhood that would allow it to persevere in spite of adversity. Taiwan's society seemed highly vulnera· ble to destabiliution. Nearly half of Taiwan...