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8 / The December legislative Yuan Elections Amajor object of Beijing's coercive policies was Taiwan's political process, key to which were the elections to Taiwan's Legislative . Yuan scheduled for December 1995. These were only the second fully direct, popular election for the Legislative Yuan, the first having been in 1992. They were Widely seen in Taiwan as a prelude to Taiwan's first direct election of its president in March 1996. The December 1995 elections thus marked an important step forward in the institutionaliza· tion ofTaiwan's new democratic processes. The December elections took place in the shadow of Beijing'sJuly-August missile demonstrations and subsequent continuing PLA maneuvers. Beijing's moves influenced the political process, and the election's outcome-the erosion of Lee Tenghul 's position; combined with dramatic gains for the New Partyconfirmed to CCl' leaders the ability of military coercion to affect Tai· wan's electoral process.! Lee Teng-hul's modification ofTaipei's traditional "one China" policy and his pragmatic diplomacy of 1993-94 were unpopular among a significant section of the K.\4T, which viewed Lee's actions as abandoning the principles of Sun Vat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching.kuo and as tantamount to declaring Taiwan's independence. Disagreements over these issues commingied with disputes over power and domestic policy. Lee was moving Taiwan in the direction of a more presidential and less ministerial government. He was also consoUdating his political base, edging out people traditionally influential within the Party. Many of these "new outSiders," or members of the "nonmainstream" faction, were first- or second-generation mainlanders. Some in the Party also felt that Lee was autocratic and dose-mInded-unwilling to alter direction or to heed those beyond his base of loyalists. Others felt there was a pressing need for reform in such areas as corruption and the undue influence of money and criminal elements in politics. In short, the KMT was increasingly fractious. 89 90 The December Elections Even before the May 1995 announcement of Lee's obtaining a visa to visit the United States, there had been a deepening split in the KMT. In April Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Wei-kuo addressed a rally commemorating the twentieth anniversary of his father's death. Chiang treated the crowd to a bIting denundation of Lee Teng-huI, accusing him of "stealing Chinese territory by creating a new country on Tai· wan." Several days later a member of the KMT Central Committee called on "real KMT members" to join a new anti-Lee caucus to "save and reform " the Party. Lee Teng-hut was a "traitor," he said. The man was expelled from the KMT but refused to depart, saying that he had been elected by the Party rank and file. Efforts to patch over the growing differences between Lee's mainstream and the nonmainstream factions failed. Many in the nonmainstream group critidzed Lee's upcoming visit to the United States. Some noted that the trip was being handled by the Presidential Office rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and charged this was another example ofLee's ignoring his own top advisors and making dedsions in a dictatorial fashion. Others felt that the trip was unnecessarily provocative. Rather than risk confrontation with BeiJing, Taiwan's president should attend to pressingdomestic problems or, for that matter, fadlitate the growing cross-Strait relationship upon which Taiwan's economy increasinglydepended. Many feared that Lee's u.s. visit might predpitate a clash with the mainland. A poll taken in June indicated that 38 percent of respondents opposed the trip if it risked military confrontation in the Strait. Only 36 percent supported the visit if it risked confrontation.! Beijing did what it could to exacerbate these fears. On 1Julyit accused President Lee of "wrongdoing"-he had "seriously damaged" crossStrait relations by making his u.s. trip. Xinhua News Agency was even more explicit, saying that Cbina would "use fresh blood and lives" to prevent Taiwan from rejecting unification. The beginning of PLA missile demonstrations and military maneuvers in mid-July gave substance to these threats. Political divisions deepened in August as the KMT prepared to convene a plenary meeting of the 14th Party Congress. Shortly before that meeting Chen U-an announced he would seek the presidency as an alternative to Lee Teng-hut. Son of Chen Cheng (one of the KMT's top leaders in the 19505 and 19605), Chen U-an had been a member of the KMT...

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