Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century

6. Temporal States of Architecture: Mass Immigration and Provisional Housing in Israel

This essay examines the provisional architecture of the ma’abaras (transit towns) that were built to temporarily house immigrants who came to Israel during the period of “mass immigration” (1948–51), and were to be dismantled without a trace once the Israeli government settled these immigrants in permanent housing. O‹cial Israeli historiography depicts the creation of the ma’abaras as an improvised response to the problems caused by mass immigration. This study problematizes that account, and with it the understanding of temporary architecture. It recovers the history of the ma’abara so as to delineate an inherent contradiction of Zionism as first and foremost a modernist project that attempted to create a nation-state by radically altering the course of history, while presuming that this could be done rationally and peacefully, according to a plan. This tension informs the construction of the ma’abaras as negative temporal and spatial voids into which the eªects of accelerated historical transformation were to be channeled and contained without compromising Zionism’s utopian self-image. But along with its material aspects, the ma’abara was also a social unit in which the political agency of its inhabitants and their status as autonomous citizens were temporarily suspended. My contention is that these two characteristics of the ma’abara—as an instrument of planning and as a mode of governance—are inseparable because the Zionist nation-building project, from its inception, necessitated the momentary disempowerment of its subjects. 139 6 Temporal States of Architecture Mass Immigration and Provisional Housing in Israel roy kozlovsky absorbing mass immigration Historically, the ma’abara was devised in response to the crisis of mass immigration that followed the establishment of Israel in 1948. In just three years, Israel’s Jewish population had doubled, from 650,000 to 1.2 million (see fig. 6.1). Initially, the government assembled the immigrants into “immigration camps,” where they were documented, medically examined, and thenbilleted to available housing, which included resettlement in evacuated Palestinian towns and villages. However, in less than a year, all housing options were exhausted, the camps ceased to function as relay centers, and the ever-increasing number of stranded immigrants remained for indefinite periods in the camps’ tents and barracks, dependent on soup kitchens for daily subsistence. This failure to provide newcomers with the elementary necessities of shelter , food, employment, education, and health services soon threatened the very legitimacy of the new government. With disillusioned camp inhabitants storming the Knesset on several occasions, the minister of agriculture and development Pinhas Lavon warned that “one day a hundred thousand such people, cooped up in the camps without any other outlet could get together and rise up against us, and cause an explosion that would blow away both the government and the Knesset.”1 Levi Eshkol, who was in charge of the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department , confronted Prime Minister David Ben Gurion with similar alarm: “In the past three months death stared us in the face. . . . How could we bring Jews and settle them in tents? . . . If only we could repress our inclinations and decide to conduct the immigration according to some plan . . . satisfying both the needs of the immigrants and the needs of the state.”2 The mass immigration to Israel has been seen as a spontaneous and messianic event, one that reflected the collective aspirations of Jews of the Diaspora to return to their ancestral homeland. But Eshkol’s plea demonstrates that mass immigration was in fact the outcome of an explicit and contested policy promoted by Ben Gurion. Two strategic imperatives were behind the promotion of an unrestricted inflow of people, despite the risks and hardships this policy entailed. First, the government was concerned that Eastern European and Arab states would halt the outflow of their Jewish subjects to Israel. Restricting immigration while it was still free (albeit expensive—the Czechoslovakiangovernmentextortedafeeforeachemigrationcertificate )wouldhave left some Jewish communities behind, and, in the case of Arab countries, vulnerabletoactsof retribution.Second,rapidimmigrationwasstrategicallyused 140 Roy Kozlovsky fig. 6.1. “Jewishimmigrationbycountryof birth,”1948,1949,and1950. From Statistical Abstract of Israel, no. 2 (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1950/1951). by the state to take possession of territories that, prior to the War of Independence (1947–49), were populated by Palestinians. As Ben Gurion stated, “We have conquered territories, but without settlements they have no decisive value. . . .Settlement—thatistherealconquest!Thefutureof thestatedepends on immigration.”3 The result of this counter flow of two...