Gabriel García Moreno and Conservative State Formation in the Andes

Chapter Four. A Presidency Constrained II: Foreign Entanglements, 1861–1865

92 gabriel garcía moreno and conservative state formation As much as the federalist Constitution of 1861 and the shaky state of Ecuador ’s finances complicated García Moreno’s desire to create a modern Catholic state, foreign policy difficulties and wars hampered progress even more. Many critical biographers have attributed Ecuador’s foreign policy woes in the early 1860s to García Moreno’s irascible and impetuous temperament , and rightly so. Whether slapping a minister who had insulted his brother-in-law or chiding a close friend who had not fully credited him for his mountain-climbing efforts, García Moreno had been long famous for his short temper. In addition García Moreno lacked patience, an important attribute in a good diplomat’s arsenal. Although Rafael Carvajal, his former University of Quito schoolmate, formally headed foreign relations , García Moreno took such an activist role in his presidency that he constantly inserted himself into diplomatic affairs.1 Because the Constitution of 1861 gave him more latitude in matters of foreign policy (although only congress could declare war), García Moreno may have been more assertive simply because of his frustrations with the contentious disputes over his domestic policy. From the outset of his term, diplomatic issues plagued García Moreno . As long as Ramón Castilla held office, Peru remained a danger to Ecuador ’s survival. Castilla continued to send bullying diplomats, threaten naval blockades, and assist Urbina and Robles clandestinely, which kept Ecuador in a constant state of alert in the early 1860s. Likewise Colombia’s caudillo, Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, also saw Ecuador as a theater for his ambitions.2 Not all the fault, however, lay with aggressive neighbors, as García Moreno himself on one occasion provoked conflict. Obviously no international system like the Organization of American States existed in the nineteenth century to protect smaller states from their more aggressive A Presidency Constrained II: Foreign Entanglements, 1861–1865 Chapter Four A Presidency Constrained II: Foreign Entanglements, 1861–1865 93 neighbors, so García Moreno would have to seek alternative means of selfpreservation . And although Europeans regard their nineteenth century as one of peace, a remarkable number of international conflicts plagued Latin America. The constant internal and external threats had consequences beyond the survival of the García Moreno regime—they had an impact on his domestic agenda as well. This chapter will also explore the possibility that García Moreno used his aggressive foreign policy to promote Ecuadorian state formation, much as one of Paraguay’s dictators would unintentionally do later in the decade .3 Banding together against “the other” is a natural human phenomenon . Antipathy for one’s neighbor, such as the French and Germans have exhibited for centuries, certainly has played an important role in world history.4 In the twenty-first century, Ecuadorians have often used sports as a means of national identification against outsiders. Participation in World Cup contests has greatly animated national pride, as victories against Peru bring screaming crowds to the streets at all hours. Whether such a contemporary phenomenon can be projected onto the nineteenth century, however, poses a more complex question. Recent scholarship suggests that conscription and foreign conflict can breed nationalistic sentiment, as happened in Argentina and Brazil in the 1870s.5 Did García Moreno have the foresight to be able to manipulate xenophobia toward Colombians and Peruvians into patriotic sentiment in favor of the Catholic nation? the peru question Worried as García Moreno was about the deliberations of the constitutional assembly in 1861, he felt an even greater concern about the menacing attitude of Peru’s dictator. Now that rebellions had quieted within Peru, Castilla could again make mischief to the north. García Moreno expected no less. “There is no doubt that Castilla will be more insolent now,” he wrote his diplomatic representative in Lima. Castilla’s ambitions prevented García Moreno from reducing the size of the army and spending more on the domestic agenda. García Moreno had his spies watching and, as mentioned previously, spent the first six months of 1861 in Guayaquil making certain that the coast remained loyal to him. Not one to remain inactive, García Moreno used that time to shore up the city’s defenses by establishing cannon batteries overlooking the waterfront. When two Peruvian ships arrived in January, the interim president felt fully prepared should Castilla attempt a new blockade.6 To make...