First Available Cell: Desegregation of the Texas Prison System

Chapter 8 7,000 Days Later

ChaPTer 8 7,000 Days Later In the first chapter we discussed the zones of desegregation and how desegregation efforts often move from the outer fringes or zones inward—from the least to most contentious areas. We also showed, in Chapter 3, how U.S. military units were desegregated by way of social clubs, recreational areas, base transportation, and divisions first—efforts that paved the way for the racial mixing of fighting units, or the final zone. The decades between 1960 and 1990 involving the Texas prison system clearly illustrate our theory about racial desegregation in TDC. Texas prison officials over these decades desegregated the prison units, work areas, field force and line squads, cell blocks, tiers, and dormitories—all areas except double cells. Prison desegregation was accomplished from the outside moving inward. Yet, by 1991, only the most contentious zone remained segregated, prison cells. Predictions of a Bloodbath Publicly, TDC administrators voiced a strong commitment to cell desegregation . There was a disjunction, however, between their public comments and the opinions of unit level personnel, including wardens, officers, and staff. With some variation, those at the unit level responsible for implementing desegregation on a day-to-day basis were highly skeptical of this courtmandated policy. These cellblock level bureaucrats believed that cell desegregation would result in “blood on the tiers,” that the racial mixing of the most violent and least stable individuals in Texas was a recipe for disaster. As one warden expressed to a racial desegregation committee as late as 1990, “In-cell 164 The Inside integration is not possible.”1 The violence that followed the mid-1980s implementation of Ruiz remedies was still fresh in the minds of security staff. Unlike desegregating a field squad or dormitory (which prison staff and lawyers did not staunchly resist), desegregating cells was different.2 This is because prison officers would have little control over what occurred within cells. Moreover, cell partners or “cellies” had little opportunity for self-segregation and avoidance, something that routinely occurred in dormitories and on yards. Old-time wardens and more experienced officers, relying on their gut feelings and years of experience, predicted that cell desegregation would become a miserable and violent failure. Those new to the system did not know what to expect. The perspective taken by many seasoned custodial staff was not surprising if one considers the massive transition and pursuant chaos that had been weathered only a few years earlier in the aftermath of Ruiz.3 To those in the system, tradition was a stabilizing force, bringing a level of predictability and standardization to an unpredictable environment filled with unpredictable individuals.4 Cell desegregation, as with any major affront to tradition, would destabilize the system. Just as the stipulations of Ruiz disrupted existing inmate social arrangements and were blamed for the wave of lethal violence in the 1980s, a similar belief abounded with the prospect of cell desegregation. This belief was that the tenuous racial environment held at bay by cell segregation would explode once the final zone was penetrated. At the same time that unit-level personnel were questioning cell desegregation , upper-level administrators publicly favoring the plan nevertheless had no real idea what to expect. Officially, TDC was ready to attempt cell desegregation—7,000 days after Lamar began—and then wait and see. Documenting the Aftermath By 1991, TDC had officially implemented the Incident Data Form (IDF) to track the outcomes of cell desegregation. The IDF was originally developed for the Lamar litigation in 1988–1989 to document TDC’s belief that cell desegregation, specifically among medium- and close-custody inmates, would result in disproportionate interracial and racially motivated violence. Outcomes from the 1988–1989 pilot IDF data analysis revealed higher rates of inmate-on-inmate incidents in these higher custody levels. Despite this finding, the Lamar court and the DOJ rejected TDC’s interpretation and conclusion from the pilot IDF analysis—namely that higher rates of vio- 7,000 Days Later 165 lence in medium and close custody warranted their automatic exclusion from cell desegregation. Eventually, the prison system stipulated to desegregate minimum-, medium-, and close-custody inmates within cells. At the August 1, 1991, implementation of cell desegregation, the IDF had already become a part of TDC’s official policy and procedure. Staff members from various units had been trained in its proper use, and IDFs with unique incident identification numbers had been used at all units...