Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation

CHAPTER 2: From Islamists to Muslim Reformers: A Theory of Political Change

  From Islamists to Muslim Reformers A Theory of Political Change C H A P T E R 2 Moderation Theory An influential body of scholarship argues that radical parties become increasingly moderate if they are integrated into the legal and electoral system.1 The origins of this idea, which can be called moderation theory, are found in the work of Robert Michels, who is most well known for his “iron law of oligarchy .” He argues that Socialist parties, committed to bringing about workingclass democracy, are characterized by highly authoritarian practices.2 In fact, the very essence of the party organization does not allow for democratic decision making. Parties are controlled by a small group of leaders who develop their party’s strategies with minimum input from the members and followers.3 Another significant but more obscure aspect of his work discusses the external behavior of revolutionary Socialist parties. He identifies two causal mechanisms through which these parties lose their radical orientations: (a) pursuit of votes, and (b) organizational survival. Michels defines the modern political party as the “organization of the electoral masses.”4 Radical parties aspire to the greatest number of votes to gain strong parliamentary representation and replace the ruling elites. However, espousal of ideological and revolutionary policies alienates large segments of the electorate. Consequently, radical party leaders are faced with an inescapable dilemma: they have to eschew the pursuit of radical ideological principles to attract more votes. Radical parties gradually transform into pragmatic , vote-maximizing electoral parties to remain politically viable. Michels argues that the evolution of the German Social Democratic Party (SDP; Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) at the dawn of the twentieth century exemplifies this process. M U S L I M R E F O R M E R S I N I R A N A N D T U R K E Y   A key assumption in his theoretical framework is that vote maximization entails developing “centrist” political platforms. If the majority of voters evaluate radical political platforms as “extremist,” then these parties must develop less ideological platforms to remain competitive in elections. Alternatively , radical parties will have no electoral incentives to pursue conciliatory policies if their ideological platforms have public appeal. Another assumption is that, beyond their core constituency, which is small in number, radical parties draw support from voters who are disaffected with mainstream parties. These protest votes are sustainable as long as radical parties deliver economic prosperity and political stability. Conversely, confrontation with the regime and other parties will eventually jeopardize the voter base of radical parties. As a result, radical parties have strong incentives to develop moderate platforms and to avoid political tensions. The party might enter into government coalitions or foster political alliances to end their isolation. All these factors will tarnish the party’s radical characteristics. The second mechanism specified by Michels that tames radical parties is the fear of state repression. They become particularly vulnerable to state repression when they engage in electoral competition. As electoral parties, they can no longer retain clandestine networks. Their organizational structures are exposed to state authorities. Party leaders increasingly become concerned with state repression. As a result, the greater a party’s electoral organizational capacity, the more timid its policies are. The fear of state repression reinforces conservative tendencies of the party. To quote Michels: “The party doctrines are, whenever requisite, attenuated and deformed in accordance with the external needs of the organization.”5 The party organization acquires a life of its own at the expense of revolutionary principles. The pursuit of legality replaces the pursuit of legitimacy—the struggle against the repressive sociopolitical order. These two reinforcing mechanisms—electoral calculations and survival instincts—transform the revolutionary party into a parliamentary party that pursues accommodative policies toward the state. Under the dynamics of electoral competition and the constant threat of state repression, revolutionary parties modify their original ideological commitments and affirm their revolutionary credentials only in theory and on paper, “not on lines which interest the police.”6 Consequently, a process of substitution of ends takes place F R O M I S L A M I S T S T O M U S L I M R E F O R M E R S   whereby an organization’s survival prevails over the official ends as the party becomes institutionalized.7 In the words of a perceptive observer of political parties: A permanent gap opens between official aims...