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Notes introduction 1. Here I refer specifically to the Marxist tradition of cultural studies in the Frankfurt and Birmingham schools, but for most of this book I use the term “cultural studies” to encompass a wide variety of approaches to studying literature and culture. I discuss this issue further in Chapter 2. 2. For just a few discussions of such issues, see Frederick Luis Aldama, Postethnic and Why the Humanities Matter, especially Chapter 10; Kimberly ChabotDavis ; Rey Chow; Madhu Dubey; and Sue J. Kim. 3. In some ways, this book complements Anne Cheng’s project of engaging psychology, although here I address cognitive psychology instead of psychoanalysis . Both Cheng and I take individual emotions seriously while also not limiting our understanding of emotions to individuals. Anne Cheng writes that racial melancholia, “far from denoting a condition of surrender, embodies a web of negotiation that expresses agency as well as abjection” (17). In terms of anger, we might alter this statement as follows: far from denoting a condition of victory —or indeed, any simple singular thing—anger embodies a web of negotiations of cognitive, ideological, structural, and historical factors that may express agency as well as abjection. In this book I focus on racial anger, but I would contend that this complex dynamic of anger, which may include agency as well as abjection depending on historical contexts, is generally true. A more sustained engagement between psychoanalysis, with its investment in the unconscious, and cognitive psychology, with its emphasis on conscious and semi-conscious mental processes, remains to be done. I find both fields useful, although in this book I deal primarily with cognitive psychology. 4. For more on racial formations, see Omi and Winant, as well as Haney López. 5. As Trotsky writes in “The ABC of Materialist Dialectics,” “The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of a reality which consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of closer approximations, corrections, concretisation , a richness of content and flexibility; I would even say ‘a succulence’ which to a certain extent brings them closer to living phenomena. Not capitalism in general, but a given capitalism at a given stage of development. Not a workers’ state in general, but a given workers’ state in a backward country in an imperialist encirclement, etc.” We could add, not anger in general, but anger in and about raced, gendered, and classed bodies at a given historical moment, demonstrating certain common cognitive capabilities that are, in part, a product of these racial, gendered, and classed social formations. 6. Here “cognitive studies” encompasses developments in neuroscience, psychology , and philosophy, while “cultural studies” is shorthand for approaches that focus on cultural productions of all kinds (no longer just literature and art, but also speech, city planning, etc.) and emphasize the social construction of identities and meaning. The terms “science” and “humanities” are not quite acKim -final.indb 179 Kim-final.indb 179 7/9/13 2:52 PM 7/9/13 2:52 PM 180 notes to pages 10–16 curate because many cognitivists (and much of many of the cognitive studies on emotion I refer to in Chapter 1) are located in the social sciences, and many cultural studies critics straddle the humanities and social sciences. The distinction is not so much about disciplines as about basic principles and orientation. 7. See also work by Timothy Brennan, Priyamvada Gopal, Biodun Jeyifo, Neil Lazarus, Manning Marable, David Palumbo-Liu, E. San Juan, and Ellen Meiksin Wood. chapter 1 1. For overviews and assessments of the work of James and Lange, see Antonio Damasio’s “William James and the Modern Neurobiology of Emotion” in Evans and Cruse, Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality 3–13; Power and Dagleish 30–33; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 4–5; K. Young 81; Brennan 4; and Lyons. 2. See also Miller; Power and Dagleish 33–37; and Lyons 34–35. 3. See Dagleish and Power, particularly Chapters 1 and 2; Power and Dagleish 48–54; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 5–6; and the International Handbook of Anger (Potegal, Stemmler, and Spielberger). 4. Just the relatively short opening section, titled “Are There Basic Emotions ?” in The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, edited by Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, demonstrates the range of views on the question. Basically, it depends on what one means by “basic” and “emotions.” James Averill argues that “there appears to be no compelling reason to postulate...