State, Labor, and the Transition to a Market Economy: Egypt, Poland, Mexico, and the Czech Republic

Epilogue: The Uprising of 2011

In December 2010, a wave of protests swept through Tunisia, fueled by anger at the self-immolation of a young street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi. Soon the protests spread to other countries in the region. In Tunisia and Egypt the uprisings succeeded in deposing the countries’ presidents, Ben Ali and Mubarak, respectively. There the military was unwilling to back the countries’ rulers and regime change happened with relatively little violence. In Libya, Qaddafi’s fall and death were preceded by a months-long civil war and nato-led intervention; in Yemen, President Saleh was ousted but only after months of violent confrontations between the regime and its opponents; in Syria, the violence escalated and after a year and a half the conflict between the Assad regime and the rebel forces seemed ever more intractable; and in Bahrain the opposition movement was brutally suppressed by the regime. In mid-2012 it is still too early to tell what these political changes will ultimately bring and what the structure of the emerging political systems will be. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have all held elections that were generally seen as free and fair by observers. Even in those countries, however, it is still unclear whether democratic reforms will be consolidated. The history of past revolutions and transitions away from authoritarianism, whether in Latin America or in East Central Europe, suggests that these processes are challenging and contentious and often suffer from reversals. Nonetheless, regardless of the ultimate outcomes, the political landscape of the region has shifted in fundamental ways. epilogue The Uprising of 2011 Roots of Discontent in Egypt The government of Prime Minister Ahmed Mohamed Nazif, which came to office in July 2004, set out to accelerate the implementation of neoliberal reforms and in particular the privatization of the public sector. At the same time, the government sought to attract foreign direct investors both to purchase state-owned firms and to establish new enterprises. It was quite successful in meeting its objectives. The pace of sales of state firms accelerated noticeably, and flow of foreign investment picked up. GDP grew 7 percent a year, earning praise from the imf, which noted in 2007 that “Egypt’s economy delivered another impressive performance in 2006/2007, with high growth generated by reforms and solid macroeconomic management,”1 and from the World Bank, which ranked Egypt as the most effective country in putting in place reforms that made it easy to conduct business.2 But while the economy was growing at impressive rates, socioeconomic inequalities deepened significantly. Increasing numbers of people fell below the poverty line as jobs became scarce and subsidies on basic consumer goods were slashed. The 2008 global rise in food prices put further pressure on household budgets. Unemployment among young people was especially high, hovering around 25 percent.3 The economic misery of the majority, furthermore, was juxtaposed with the ever more conspicuous consumption of a narrow elite. Pervasive corruption, cronyism, and repression added to the growing public anger. The military, too, was increasingly concerned by the situation. In particular, it was worried about the rise in influence of the ndp faction, led by the president ’s son, Gamal Mubarak, and aligned with the new business elites.4 The military had benefited from the economic reforms implemented over the previous fifteen years, building up its economic empire, which included enterprises in such diverse industries as cement, construction, energy, and hotels. However, the military was anxious that the push to accelerate privatization epilogue 236 1. International Monetary Fund, imf Country Report, no. 07/380 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, December 2007), 3. 2. World Bank, Public Financial Management Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: An Overview of Regional Experience, Part I: Overview and Summary, Report no. 55061-MNA, June 2010, 39. 3. Economist, February 3, 2011. 4. Michele Dunne, Evaluating Egyptian Reform, Carnegie Papers, Middle East Working Paper Series, no. 66, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). might hamper its economic and political position as new generation of businessmen moved to cash in on neoliberal reforms.5 Protests in Egypt Prior to 2011 During the five years preceding the January 25, 2011, uprising, workers’ mobilization and protests intensified in response to quickened pace of privatizations and other neoliberal reforms as well as the deteriorating standards of living. The number of protests grew from over six hundred in 2007...