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William Stillman’s career from 1855 to 1868 shows that we have good reason to perceive that Ruskinian aesthetics and moralism went out of fashion. Stillman’s change of heart from his Crayon essays in 1855–56 to his numerous critiques of Ruskin beginning in 1868 might stand as proof of such. As argued, however, it was less the moralism that was troublesome to Stillman than the overtly metaphorical understanding of art that the Ruskinian definition demanded—the application of morals to the meaning of art. What did Stillman want in its place? Was he calling for a new definition of art in a way that Jarves and Cook actually were not? This chapter finds answers in Stillman’s critical language. The differences in Stillman’s post-Crayon language are indeed evident, and they correspond to the substantive criteria of his later art theory, just as his earlier language corresponded to the conceptions it delineated. First a word of warning. It is difficult to pursue an analysis of Stillman’s critical shift without being pulled into the logic of his argument. The postCrayon writing will bring us quite directly into forms of historical thinking about art, into comparisons of style based on notions of past and present usage, and into conceptions of historical change, sociocultural factors, and their bearing on subjective expression. Stillman moved both theoretically and linguistically toward more art historical bases for the understanding and assessment of art (as Jarves had only superficially professed to do), thus making this later writing resemble our own thinking to a greater degree. There5 art discourse after ruskin Time and History in Art art discourse after ruskin 93 fore, we gravitate almost automatically to questions of why, of what factors might explain these changes. We feel more compelled to seek out those contextual elements that made him like us. We may be tempted to ask: What “historically” finally produced modern art history? While these are absolutely questions to ponder—and they are not without potentially enlightening correspondence to the events and discourses of Stillman’s day—I will nonetheless keep them at bay where they most forcefully assert themselves. Again, this is not because such questions are not relevant but because the point at hand is to understand how historical thinking moved into art discourse by way of the language and to what extent this language created an effect of history, or a discourse for art that shifted art into the realm of time as opposed to the timeless. Thus, it is important to remain skeptical not only about what “history” was to Stillman but also about applying our own explanation of historical change to Stillman’s art discourse—at least until we have completely dissected the rhetoric to see how it works. Of course, this still begs the questions of why language would change, why “an effect of history” would appear in art discourse, and where, if not in the material and cultural conditions of the moment, the answers would lie. So I repeat that this is not an argument for art and art discourse not being historical, not being bound at every level to their time. But as an investigation of how “history” itself is deployed in art discourse, it remains crucial, if frustrating, to avoid confusing the issue by introducing ostensibly “real” (our) historical questions into the mix. This will become clearer further on. We must first establish what is at stake in the distinction between a linguistically created effect of history and the historical. Turning, then, to the specific analysis of Stillman’s later criticism, we see signs of different priorities, and these correspond to the trajectory of our periodization: art began to be evaluated as a form, as a representation, as a creative process. The bases of discussion and of standards seem to be aesthetic and expressive. These imply a different definition for art than the one we have seen up to now in our critics’ words. Stillman’s post-Crayon writing took art to be a formal expression, a pictorial conceptualization whose aesthetic beauty, or richness, or strength, was its idea. Or, it might be stated that art was a successfully achieved aesthetic formulation whose value was derived from its expressive particularity. As such, artistic insight and artistic means became the cornerstones of “true” art. Yet, to be clear, Stillman was by no means suggesting that art was pure form, existing solely “for art’s sake.” The notion of an...

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