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This book explores whether, when, and how representation and accountability exist in a context of poverty. It asks, do the poor count in Latin American politics? . . . or was O’Donnell (1992) correct to worry that poor people would once again be ignored? These are important questions for democratic consolidation because in most Latin American countries poor people make up a large part of the population. It is hard to imagine that democratic regimes can deepen if a large sector of society does not receive representation because it lacks the capacity to hold elected officials accountable. Yet poor people in some countries appear to support the democratic regime and continue to vote for established parties. In other countries poor people have turned away from established parties, backing populist, antiparty, even antidemocracy politicians. In this book I have offered an institutional explanation for this difference. Institutions can enhance or limit the capacity of poor people to sanction elected officials. Institutions can also give elected officials incentives to build their career on support from poor voters, and they can prompt politicians to adopt an identity or preferences about holding office that make them want to attend to the needs of poor people. In such institutional settings, while democracy may not deepen, poor people are given a reason to work within the democratic system to address their needs. The questions driving this book were prompted by reading chapters by Ferejohn and Fearon in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin (1999). These renowned formal theorists present models of democratic accountability between citizens and elected officials . While not explicitly writing about the challenges of creating accountability in countries with advanced industrialized economies, their models seem to assume a reasonably uniform capacity across citizens to monitor and sanction EIGHT do the poor count in latin american democracies? officials. They acknowledge that most people, even highly educated, financially well-off citizens, do not expend much effort monitoring elected representatives —but the potential is there, and that potential for being monitored, and for being sanctioned if citizens find their performance lacking, is what creates an incentive for elected officials to represent the interests of the people who elect them. Lack of vigilant monitoring creates the opportunity for elected officials to not faithfully represent constituents’ preferences; but if shirking becomes too blatant, the potential exists that constituents will take notice and punish the official. Reading those elegant formal theories about the mechanisms that promote accountability in democracy prompted the question, does accountability break down when some people have much less capacity than others to monitor and sanction elected officials? A stark difference in the capacity to monitor and in the tools available for sanctioning unacceptable performance is a challenge for democracy in a context of poverty. It is one of the differences between rich and poor people that disadvantages the poor, even in democratic regimes based on the principle of one person, one vote. This question led me to consider how institutions affect the ability of poor and rich people to sanction, and how combinations of institutions shape legislators’ preferences for wanting a government post and constrain their strategies for building a political career, thereby creating incentives to represent different types of constituents. There is a vast literature about democratization in Latin America, some of which alludes to how lack of representation of poor people will impede the consolidation of democracy (e.g., Karl 1990; O’Donnell 1992; Huber, Rueschemeyer , and Stephens 1999; Lievesley 1999; Hagopian 2005; Seligson 2007). Also, there is an expanding literature about how the design of democratic institutions affects how democratic regimes function in Latin America, but this literature focuses on the elite level of executive-legislative relations and party control over officials. Literature about electoral rules explores whether institutions give politicians an incentive to seek a personal or a party vote, but does not differentiate among groups in the mass public or address whether the differing capacity of groups to monitor and sanction elected officials means politicians will have a greater incentive to seek the approval of some people rather than others. This book links these literatures and combines rational choice and historical institutionalism to theorize and examine how institutions shape whether, when, and how the poor count in democratic politics. This chapter briefly explores implications for government policy outputs of this theory of incentives to represent poor people. Then I draw conclusions 172 d o t h e p o o r c o u n t ? [18.191.239...

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