Imperfect Oracle: The Epistemic and Moral Authority of Science

1. Authority and Autonomy

Before anything signiWcant can be said about the authority or moral authority of science, we need to be clear on what these words denote. There are several types of authority. Joseph Raz, in his introduction to the 1990 volume Authority, writes: “An authority on medieval coins, or on Chinese eleventh-century porcelain, or on quantum mechanics, or on aerodynamic properties of some new materials: these are all people who are expert in their Welds, i.e., who are good at stating how things are. Their judgement is a particularly reliable guide as to how things are, independently of that judgement” (2). He adds: “To have authority . . . is to be an expert who can vouch for the reliability of particular information. This authority of the expert can be called theoretical authority, for it is an authority about what to believe.” We all defer to the authority of experts in our everyday lives. We count on physicians to correctly diagnose our ailments, on the meteorologist to give us a reasonable forecast of tomorrow’s weather, our Wnancial advisers to steer us clear of imprudent investments. In doing so we do not generally ask for a detailed description of their line of reasoning, though we may be reassured by a modicum of explanation. It is just good common sense to defer to the authority of experts in many areas of life where we lack the background and insights to make decisions on our own. We do, however, require a sense of surety that the expert is really knowledgeable and trustworthy . When we are confronted with having to choose between opposing authoritative views of a matter, we generally end up choosing a particular one au thori t y and au tonomy one on the basis of trust. In looking for the origins of science’s authority, therefore, we will be searching for what it is about science that engenders trust. In his book Science in a Social World, Alvin Goldman o¤ers a deWnition of an authority in characteristic philosopher lingo: “Person A is an authority in subject S if and only if A knows more propositions in S, or has a higher degree of knowledge of propositions in S, than almost anybody else” (1999, 268). Authority is deWned here as depending on knowledge held, in terms of what is known as well as its signiWcance. Goldman is quite willing to enlarge this deWnition to include the intellectual skills needed to answer questions on a given topic, even if the answers have not already been found. In a case of conXicting advice from sources that claim expertise, and in the absence of any other grounds for making a distinction, we would be inclined to trust the source that we deem to have the greatest expertise with respect to the matter at hand (Goldman 2006, 14–38). There is often no foolproof way to establish expertise, however, or to be sure that we have not been led by various social and cultural inXuences to accept bogus claims (Walton 1997, chap. 1). Suppose we have a diªcult issue facing us, and there are many ramiWcations attending either of two potential solutions. As prudent people should, we seek expert advice on how to proceed. But how do we know when we have found a reliable expert? We may rely on reputation, credentials, demeanor, and other characteristics , but because we are, by deWnition, not expert in the matter at hand, we are hard put to feel that we have rational grounds for making the right choice. If we consult another expert for advice on the Wrst expert, we have simply moved the question back one level: how can we know that this second expert is a reliable authority? There is no simple answer to this dilemma; in practice we acquire beliefs and knowledge through the testimony of others and through surrender of some of our epistemic individualism (Hardwig 2006, chap. 11). While authority generally may be essential to the life of society, it is not always seen in a favorable light. In whatever form it appears, there is in some sense a coercive or suppressive quality about it; it militates against actions and thoughts that di¤er from those promoted by the authority itself. For example, with respect to truth: Our daily life is constantly troubled by vexing questions, ideological , ethical, political, esthetic, and factual, to which we cannot remain 20 foundations indi¤erent, to...