Imperfect Oracle: The Epistemic and Moral Authority of Science

9. The Prospects for Scientific Authority

I have claimed in this book that it is possible to discern two kinds of authority for science. One of these is expert, or epistemic, authority: the capacity to convincingly speak about features of the natural world. The second is moral authority: the license to argue convincingly about how the world should be. To properly understand science’s roles in society, we need to distinguish between these two forms of authority, and at the same time recognize their interdependence. Related to the concepts of expert and moral authority is that of autonomy, the capacity for self-determination. For example, the autonomy of the individual scientist in choosing research projects and pursuing promising discoveries is deemed vital to the advance of science. For science as a social institution, autonomy in such matters as credentialing, evaluation of research claims, assignment of credit, recognition of outstanding work, and adjudication of questions relating to fraud and ethical misconduct is at the heart of the scientiWc ethos. Our exploration of these themes has shown that it is not diªcult to justify a general scientiWc expert authority. The extent to which science and technology have demonstrated a reliable understanding of the physical world, and the manifold instrumental beneWts that have accrued to society, are ample evidence of a vast expertise. The transformative e¤ects of science and technology on the conditions of life in Western society have created an air of authority for science that penetrates deeply into many aspects of daily life. At the same time, our account has revealed that science ’s epistemic authority has limits. When conXicts with other sources nine the prospec ts for scien t ific authorit y of authority arise, scientiWcally based rationality often fails to carry the day. Religious beliefs, mistrust of science, rejection of science’s value system, and conXicting cultural, political, or economic commitments are among the many factors that limit acceptance of science’s claims. With whatever limitations may attend it, the authority of science generally serves to sustain the expert authority of individual scientists as they communicate their results, both within and outside the boundaries of science as a social sector. We have seen that expert authority is a necessary element in establishing a moral authority for science, but it is insuªcient by itself. What is needed in addition is the belief that scientists and the scientiWc institutions and communities within which they function are committed to improving the welfare of society. This means active participation on the part of scientists in societal a¤airs, not merely a general assertion that science and technology have led to societal beneWts (Yankelovich 2003). In this Wnal chapter I want to integrate conclusions drawn from foregoing chapters with certain other considerations not yet examined. Our particular concern is with American science. We saw in chapter 3 that the growth and development of science in the United States was very much shaped by the fact that the nation itself was in a nascent stage. There was an emphasis on the practical, an enthusiasm for new ventures. Science was valued more for what it could contribute to economic development and geographical expansion than for its contributions to intellectual life. As science took root, however, with the establishment of research universities and institutions in which basic research was emphasized, scientists followed the lead of European nations in insisting on science for science’s sake. Thus, the stage was set for contrasting images of science that have persisted to the present day: science as a bounded community with internally driven goals and standards of both admission and performance, and science as an outwardly attentive community with multiple enduring ties to the rest of society. We begin with a brief return to the historical roots of American science, and move from there to an assessment of how science performs as an element of democratic society. the pragmatic turn What would a modern-day Alexis de Tocqueville write about the state of science in the United States? Certainly it would be a vastly di¤erent assessment the prospects for scientific authority 271 from what the young Frenchman wrote on the basis of his nine-month visit to the United States in 1831. From what were the merest beginnings of scientiWc study in the early nineteenth century, American science has become an extensive, varied enterprise with enormous global inXuence. But despite all this success, there are tensions. Surprisingly perhaps, they were...