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index Abu Sayyaf group, 14 n. 19 accommodation: conflict management and, 65; end of cold war and improved climate for, 54–55 administrative proportional representation, 30 Afghanistan: civil war in, 5 n. 7, 11; peace settlement in, 21; postconflict environment in, 84 n. 26; power-sharing institutions in, 39, 150 n. 19 African National Congress (anc), 140, 177; naming of, 1; territorial autonomy issues and, 35 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 39 al-Nimeiry, Gaafar, 69 alternative model specification, negative binomial regression, 62 n. 22, 167–69 Alvor Accord (Angola), 111–13 Angola: Alvor Accord in, 111–13; Bicesse Accords , 14, 115–19, 172–73; civil war in, 11; continuity of civil war in, 122 n. 28; economic issues in civil war of, 35–36; Gbadolite Accord in, 21–22, 43, 113–15, 155; Lusaka Protocol , 119–25, 173; military power-sharing in, 100, 172–73; negotiated settlement in, 19–20, 109–25, 138–39; settlement institutionalization in, 124–25; third-party mediation in, 123–25 Anstee, Margaret, 118–19 Aquino, Corazon, 129–30 Argentina, civil war in, 5 army size, military power-sharing/powerdividing institutions, 98, 162–64 Arusha Peace Accord, 176 Atlas, Pierrre, 94 authoritarian inastitutions, 25–26 Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (armm), 130, 137–38 Azerbaijan: military power-sharing in, 173; negotiated settlement in, 98 n. 22 Baker, James, 115 balance of power: security concerns linked to, 27–28; territorial autonomy and, 34–35 Bangladesh, peacekeeping operations in, 91 bargained resolutions: democratic norms and, 52; economic development and creation of, 106–7; effectiveness of conflict resolution in, 10–11; impact on negotiated settlement of, 44–45; Philippines case study, 125–38 bargaining failure, civil war as product of, 16–18 behavior: costly signaling and modification of, 96–97; institutional regulation of, 26–28, 41–42 Bicesse Accords (Angola), 14, 138–39; Lusaka Protocol compared with, 120–25; military power-sharing in, 100, 115–19, 172–73; settlement institutionalization in, 124–25 bipolar confrontations, post-cold war, 74 n. 15 Blondin Beye, Alioune, 120 Bosnia: Dayton Accords and, 33; incentives for moderation in, 148–50; life expectancy as indicator of civil war, 73, 81; military powersharing in, 173; power-sharing inefficiencies in, 151 Bosniak-Croat Federation, 33, 176 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 119 Burundi, 57 Bush, George W., 90 Cambinda oil enclave, 35 Cambodia: failure of military power-sharing in, 100–101, 173; international proxies in civil war in, 54–55; negotiated settlement of con- flict in, 3; third-party mediation in conflict in, 88 188 index Canada, power-sharing/power-dividing institutions in, 38–39 Carrington (Lord), 55–56 casualty statistics from conflicts, 8–9; duration of negotiated settlements and, 80–84, 104 n. 30; impact on power sharing of, 164–66; intensity of conflict measured by, 51, 60, 70–71 censor data, durability data for negotiated settlements using, 77 Chad: military power-sharing in, 174; Transitional Government of National Unity in, 32 Chamorro, Violeta Barrios de, 32–33, 67, 175–76 Chapultepec Agreement (El Salvador), 22, 174 Chechnya: failure of military power-sharing in, 103, 174; negotiated settlement in, 98 n. 22 China, Angolan civil war and, 112 Chissano, Joaquim, 100 choice, determinants in institutions of, 12–13 Christian community: Angola peace settlement and, 125; Philippines negotiated settlement and role of, 126, 128–37 Christian Science Monitor, 133 civil society: in Angola, 125; power-sharing limitations in, 154 n. 27 civil war: classification of settlements, 6; collapse of rules and, 18; costs of, 8–11; determinants for onset of, 71 n. 8; negotiated settlements for ending, 5–7, 39; negotiated truces in, 7; post-conflict for power-sharing/ power-dividing institutions following, 46–55; role of institutions, 1; security concerns following, 23–26; trends in settlement of, 10–11. See also conflict Civil War (United States), 46 n. 3 Clinton, Bill, 57, 90 coercive capacity: of bargained resolutions, 127–29; of military victory, 146; power sharing and neutralization of, 31–33; of state power, 28; of third-party mediation, 105–6 cold war, end of, influence on peace agreements of, 54–55, 74 collectivities: access to state power and, 92–93; alienation of supporters in, 93–95; economic power-sharing/power-dividing institutions and, 35–36; proportional strategies of, 29–31; territorial autonomy and, 33–35, 66 Colombia: National Front Agreement in, 3; negotiated settlement of war in, 5; partisan power-sharing in, 24 combatants...

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