The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru

6. Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Fujimori's Peru

SIX Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Fujimori’s Peru julio f. carrión A defining feature of the regime of Alberto Fujimori was its sustained level of approval in public opinion polls.1 Although this support declined after 1997, it remained significantly high (in comparison with that for previous administrations) despite Fujimori’s frequent and egregious abuses of power. More surprisingly, even after the public became highly critical of Fujimori’s economic policy, the annual average approval rating during his second term never dropped below 40 percent. As Fujimori inaugurated his controversial third term in the wake of an electoral process marred by accusations of fraud and heavy-handed tactics, he still enjoyed a popularity rating of above 45 percent.2 Fujimori’s remarkable performance in opinion polls is even more surprising when one considers that in terms of employment and income levels, Peruvians were no better off in 2000 than in 1990. It is true that inflation was under control by 1995, but neither employment nor average income showed a dramatic recovery during the 1990s. In 2000, the unemployment rate in metropolitan Lima was 7.9 percent, only slightly better than the 8.3 percent registered in 1990 (inei 2001a). Moreover, the average blue-collar salary only increased by a total of 5 percent between 1990 and March 2000 (inei 2001b). Given Fujimori’s penchant for authoritarianism and his rather For their thoughtful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Francisco Durand, Charles Kenney, Carol Wise, and the anonymous reviewers. public opinion, market reforms, and democracy 127 weak record in terms of job creation and income improvement, one wonders why almost up to the very end the public was so fond of this regime. This is one of the questions that I seek to answer in this chapter. Another question to be asked here is related to the relationship between market reforms and presidential popularity. The Peruvian public reacted particularly well to an extremely harsh fiscal shock implemented during Fujimori’s first month in office. Even though the social effects of this shock were traumatic (income and employment fell steadily in the 1990–93 period), Peru was able to avoid the deep social upheaval that plagued other Latin American nations when milder versions of market reforms were attempted. Despite the economic shock, Fujimori’s popularity rose in 1990 and, after a brief decline in 1991, continued to grow in the wake of Peru’s ‘‘liberal revolution’’ and the subsequent April 1992 autogolpe.3 There is no doubt that Fujimori made the most of his significant popular approval. Making virtue of necessity and given his lack of an organized and solid political party, he used public opinion polls to fight his opponents in Congress and gain political momentum. Confronted with figures that clearly indicated public approval for the president’s overall performance in office, the opposition had a difficult time devising an effective strategy. In the context in which politics was becoming more media oriented (in part because of the demise of traditional parties), Fujimori ’s relative success in opinion polls served him particularly well. This was evident in the wake of his autogolpe. Strong public support for this authoritarian act enabled Fujimori to resort to elections to calm international concerns and legitimize his rule. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that Fujimori was completely in step with the public mood. Public opinion was in many instances highly critical of his actions or policies. For instance, although the public was quite willing to grant him significant freedom in the fight against domestic insurgency and even to accept some violations of due process for those accused of terrorism, Peruvians were not willing to support egregious human rights violations. In a similar vein, citizens rejected some of his economic policies regardless of their support for his overall performance in office. In almost all instances in which Fujimori found himself on the opposite side of public opinion, he chose to disregard it. Alberto Fujimori used public opinion to legitimize his authoritarian project ; he was not bound by it. Fujimori’s sustained popularity raises some interesting questions about the relationship between public opinion, market reforms, and de- the fujimori legacy 128 mocracy in Peru. Why did the public tolerate a regime that systemically violated democratic standards? Why did the public initially support a radical program of market reforms even...