Money and Politics

Seeds of Cynicism: The Struggle over Campaign Finance, 1956–1974

JULIAN E. ZELIZER Seeds of Cynicism: The Struggle over Campaign Finance, 1956–1974 “It is a cesspool, it is a source of infection for the body politic,” Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) warned his fellow senators in 1973 about the private financing of elections. “[I]f it doesn’t stop, there are going to be good men in this hall right here today who are going down the drain, not that you are guilty, not that you have done anything wrong, but that the public is disenchanted with all of us, and they are going to want somebody new and say I want a fresh one here.”1 From 1971 through President Nixon’s resignation in 1974, Congress enacted the boldest campaign finance reforms in American history, including strong disclosure laws, public financing for presidential elections, contribution and spending limits, and an independent enforcement commission. Despite these reforms, after only a decade under the new laws, citizens still felt that campaign finance was corrupt. Campaign finance is one of the most vexing problems in American democracy. To achieve reform, proponents must convince incumbent politicians to change a system in which they have succeeded. To make matters more difficult, campaign finance reform The University at Albany, the Carl Albert Center, the Dirksen Congressional Research Center, and the Gerald Ford Foundation generously provided grants that funded this research. The following are the collections and abbreviations used for this article: Carl Albert Center, Norman, Oklahoma (CAC); Common Cause Papers , Princeton, New Jersey (CCP); Papers of the Democratic National Committee , Washington, D.C. (DNCP); Papers of the Democratic Study Group, Washington , D.C. (DSGP); George Meany Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland (GMA); Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (GFL); James O’Hara Papers , Ann Arbor, Michigan (JOP); John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts (JFKL); Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (LBJL); Mike Mansfield Papers, Missoula, Montana (MMP); Richard Nixon Papers , College Park, Maryland (RNP). THE STRUGGLE OVER CAMPAIGN FINANCE, 1956–1974 74 has never been driven by strong electoral pressure. The laws that passed in the early 1970s provide policy historians an opportunity to contribute to current debates about reforming the ties between money and politics. In studying the 1970s reforms, the first puzzle historians must solve is how campaign finance reform passed despite enormous political opposition and lukewarm public support.2 Although most accounts stress Watergate, this study suggests that a more complex intersection of events culminated in reform. By placing less explanatory weight on the Watergate scandal to evaluate the 1974 legislation , this essay stresses how antecedent political events created a window of opportunity for reformers at the same time that prior decisions limited the long-term impact of their accomplishments.3 In the 1960s, campaign finance reform did not emerge because of intense electoral pressure but, rather, emanated from a reform coalition that was neither a grassroots movement nor a group of elites at the center of political power. Rather, these were political actors operating at the margins of power who believed that representative government could be improved. The coalition, composed of legislators , experts, philanthropists, foundations, and public interest groups, was at the heart of the struggle over campaign finance. Members of this coalition claimed that substantive institutional reform was essential to restore public trust in democratic politics. Refusing to believe that politicians would independently monitor or cleanse their own institutions, the coalition supported a number of reforms in the political process ranging from the codification of ethics to the creation of an independent prosecutor. Campaign finance always maintained the most tenuous position of all the reforms (compared to filibuster reform, for example) since it touched on every interest in the political system, including legislators who were supportive of process reform. Still, the coalition was able to place campaign finance reform on the national agenda even without widespread public interest or support.4 But the efforts of this coalition were not sufficient for reform to pass.5 Even without strong public pressure, politicians in the 1960s developed a self-interest in campaign finance reform as a result of escalating television costs and the evolving financial condition of the parties. A new adversarial media, moreover, created the perception that opposing campaign finance reform could be politically dangerous . These forces produced the political interest needed to make reform viable. Politicians then restructured the coalition’s proposals to satisfy their own needs. Watergate created political support for JULIAN E. ZELIZER...