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3. The Persian Gulf War
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The Persian Gulf War iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, brought the United States into conflict with a Persian Gulf state that was close to the Soviet Union geographically and had been a Soviet arms recipient. In the past, Moscow almost certainly would have defended its client and strongly opposed U.S. armed intervention near the Soviet borders. This time, in an important test of the new relationship between the superpowers, Baker and Shevardnadze issued a joint statement condemning the Iraqi action and calling for an arms embargo against Iraq. While not without misgivings and internal opposition, the Soviet posture was a major asset in the U.S. drive to line up a powerful and inclusive coalition to drive Iraq from Kuwait. In the following discussion, the conferees address how the United States elicited Moscow’s cooperation against the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and analyze Gorbachev’s frantic diplomatic efforts during the crisis. Oberdorfer: This morning we are going to focus on the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August first of 1990, a cooperative arrangement that led to the restarting of the Middle East peace process after the war against Iraq. Yesterday we had a debate about when the Cold War really ended. Chapter l of Secretary Baker’s memoir is titled “The Day the Cold War Ended,” which in his definition was the day he and Minister Shevardnadze issued in Moscow a joint declaration opposing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, calling for an arms embargo, and agreeing to take practical measures to oppose this aggression. I’d like to start by asking Secretary Baker a little about the significance in his mind of these two former antagonists standing together against an action taken by Iraq. Baker: Don, as we began to move from confrontation to cooperation, certainly in Malta and maybe even a little before that, the words coming from each side were clearly consonant with the idea that the Cold War was over. But the action really began with the unification of Germany and particularly what happened on August 3, 1990. That’s why I say that as far as I’m concerned , that’s clearly the day the Cold War ended. It was quite remarkable for the American secretary of state and the foreign minister of the Soviet Union 3 Wolhforth Chapter 3 12/27/02 12:02 AM Page 77 to stand shoulder to shoulder and condemn the actions of Iraq, which had been, after all, a Soviet client state. It would have been unthinkable and unheard of in an earlier time. I begin the book flashing back to the day in late January 1981 when I was walking across West Executive Avenue with Ronald Reagan to conduct his first press conference as the newly elected president of the United States. That’s where he made reference to the Soviet Union in a very, very negative way, and here, scarcely nine years later, we’re standing side by side, not only condemning the action, but agreeing that we would join together in implementing an arms embargo against Iraq.1 This was not an easy action for the Soviet Union to take. Shevardnadze told me later, in fact, that while he had the approval of President Gorbachev to jointly condemn the action, he did not have specific or express approval to join with us in an arms embargo or at least that portion of the statement that called for an arms embargo. It would be interesting to hear from our Russian colleagues what was actually happening back in Moscow at that time. I think one reason that Shevardnadze was so forward leaning in this case was because we had been meeting a few days before in Irkutsk and we got reports from back home that Iraqi troops were beginning to mass. I raised it in a meeting with Shevardnadze —Sergei was there—and I said: “We have some very disturbing reports. I wish you would check into it and perhaps you can restrain Iraq.” They came back and said, “There’s nothing to it. We’ve checked with our intelligence sources; it would be completely irrational for Saddam Hussein to do this. It’s not going to happen, don’t worry about it.” Two days later, of course, Iraq invaded Kuwait. One reason I think Eduard was so forward leaning in this instance was because he felt embarrassed and in a sense betrayed...