Power in the Balance: Presidents, Parties, and Legislatures in Peru and Beyond

Notes

259 Notes 1. Introduction 1. See Hauriou (1916), cited in Gray (2010, 126). 2. See, for example, Linz (1990), Shugart and Carey (1992), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Carey and Shugart (1998), Shugart (1998), and many others cited throughout this book. 3. See foundational works by Lijphart (1984; 1999); March and Olsen (1989); and Douglass North (1990). 4. For Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003), “horizontal exchange” is contingent upon the functionality of the legislature’s own “vertical accountability”— its responsiveness to voters and citizens. For a dissenting view, and a valuable dissection of the concept of horizontal accountability, see Kenney 2003b. 5. See Huntington (1968), Dahl (1971), Anderson (1974), Linz and Stepan (1996), Zakaria (1997), O’Donnell (1999b). For an excellent overview, see Remmer (1997). 6. Sectors in which the CTP dominated in the 1960s included dockworkers and stevedores, sugarcane workers in the APRA stronghold of the North Coast, white-collar office workers, bus and taxi drivers, textile workers, hotel and restaurant employees, fisheries workers, and miners (Payne 1965). 7. Benavides had earlier served as provisional president in 1914–1915. 8. The main text of the 1933 Constitution does not provide for a presidential veto, partial or package. However, a “Transitory Disposition,” a temporary addendum to the charter, states that while the Senate is being reconstituted, the president may exercise a package veto and force Congress to reconsider a bill, with no particular qualified majority in Congress required to override it (Chirinos Soto 1997). 9. Benavides also extra-constitutionally reduced the bicameral legislature to one chamber for several years. 10. Veto override then required a three-fifths vote of Congress. 11. For explanations of the 1968 coup highlighting ideological and professional shifts within the military, see Stepan (1978) and North and Korovkin (1981). Cotler (1975) and Quijano Obregón (1972) instead emphasize the weakness of Peru’s bourgeois class and suggest that the military served as its stand-in, executing the structural reforms required to break the power of Peru’s oligarchy. 12. This was the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers of Peru (Confederaci ón de Trabajadores Revolucionarios del Perú, or CTRP). 13. Under Velasco, many sugar plantations had been expropriated and converted from private holdings to government-sponsored cooperatives; see Alexander (2007). 14. For those who subscribe to a class-based analysis (e.g., Cotler 1978; 1983), the explanation for this pattern lies in elite consolidation of power by means of excluding, rather than incorporating, popular demands. As Cotler puts it, “Peru’s dominant classes did not succeed in organizing the population around the principles of the state” (1983, 4). Other authors point to fragmented cultures and identities. In this formulation, Peru is a weak state because the nation lacks integration: the dualism of national cultures, and particularly the divide between its small coastal elite and its large indigenous population, was unbridgeable. For historical anthropologist Mark Thurner, postcolonial Peru was little more than a shift “from two republics to one divided” (1997). Finally, for Cecilia Méndez (2005), the story of Peru’s weak national state is more a by-product of how history has been written than a reflection of historical reality. 15. See census data (INEI 2007); election data compiled by Tuesta Soldevilla (“Elecciones Presidenciales,” n.d.). 16. AP boycotted the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections in protest of this exclusion. 17. Though an economic crisis also hit Peru in the early 1980s, the debacle of the late 1980s was much more severe: multiple years of double-digit drops in GDP per capita and annual inflation rates over 1,000 percent were unique to the latter crisis (see data reproduced in Kenney 2004, 23). 2. Beyond Formal Rules and Institutions: Theorizing Executive and Legislative Powers 1. O’Donnell (1996) also points to the poor quality of civil and human rights, and the geographic and social heterogeneity of the rule of law, in many new democracies. 2. See O’Donnell (1999b) for a discussion of the distinct liberal, republican , and democratic components of modern representative democracies. 3. Horowitz (1990) disagrees, pointing to the “centripetal” qualities of presidentialism. 4. For Mark Jones (1995a), the problem with presidential regimes is that many of them have electoral laws that tend to produce divided governments, 260 Notes to Pages 14–29 while presidentialism is most effective when presidents enjoy legislative majorities or near-majorities. Suárez (1982), Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1989), Lijphart (1990), and Linz (1994) also point to...