Evidence and Transcendence: Religious Epistemology and the God-World Relationship

Swinburne and Rationalism

Chapter 1 Swinburne and Rationalism 3 The philosopher Richard Swinburne is acutely conscious of the threat to religious belief, in particular Christian belief, posed by the argument that any truth claim must be justified or grounded in evidence . Dismissing the appeal to faith alone, he accepts the need to provide justification for Christian beliefs. Accordingly, he attempts to reassert the role of the metaphysical in religious epistemology by what he considers rational, even “scientific,” argument. The three elements of Swinburne’s defense of Christian faith are laid out in his trilogy: in The Coherence of Theism1 he asserts the meaningfulness and coherence of the claim that there is a God; in The Existence of God2 he sets out his empirical argument for the probable existence of God; and in Faith and Reason3 he argues that the specific beliefs of the Christian Church are more probable than any religious alternative . When these works first appeared in the 1970s and 1980s they were ambitious attempts to meet, on their own terms, twentiethcentury philosophical critics who rejected religious belief as irrational or unjustified. Swinburne does not argue explicitly that God exists. He argues, rather, that theism is coherent and that belief in God is not unscientific and not irrational. He sets out to prove that there are good a posteriori arguments—arguments from evidence—that make it probable that God exists. These arguments will be inductive, not analytic; they will have the power not merely to expound and justify 02 inman chap01:Layout 1 2/20/08 10:20 AM Page 3 but to persuade. Swinburne claims that it is possible, by force of rational argument, to demonstrate not merely that holding a theistic belief is as rational as holding no such belief, but also that logically one should embrace theism rather than atheism. This same process, he claims, may be used to prove that logically one should opt for Christianity rather than any theistic alternative. But how satisfactory, from an epistemological viewpoint, is Swinburne ’s defense of the coherence of theism and the probable existence of God? And from a philosophical and theological perspective, how well does it uphold the notion of God’s transcendence? To answer these questions , it is necessary to examine in detail Swinburne’s religious epistemology and his philosophy of God. It will also be pertinent to consider just how well his account of Christian faith resonates with standard Christian teachings. The Defense of the Coherence of Theism In arguing the case for theism, Swinburne defines the theist as someone who holds certain core beliefs common to all theists, for example, that God is perfectly good and knows everything. In addition to these core beliefs, the theist may or may not hold further beliefs: By a theist I understand a man who believes that there is a God. By a ‘God’ he understands something like a ‘person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything , is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe’. Christians, Jews, and Muslims are all in the above sense theists. Many theists also hold further beliefs about God, and in these Christians, Jews, and Muslims differ among themselves; and yet further beliefs, in which some members of each group differ from others. Christians assert, and Jews and Muslims deny, that God became incarnate in Jesus Christ. Roman Catholics assert, and Protestants deny, that Christ is ‘really’ present in the bread consecrated in the Mass.4 4 evidence and transcendence 02 inman chap01:Layout 1 2/20/08 10:20 AM Page 4 Swinburne’s definition of a theist occurs at the start of The Coherence of Theism, the first volume of his trilogy on philosophical theology, and his subsequent theological considerations presuppose this understanding of theism. He takes as his premise that a Christian or a Jew or a Muslim has a core set of beliefs about God, which includes such things as God’s perfection, and also has other beliefs that make him or her specifically a Christian or a Jewish or a Muslim theist. Swinburne proposes a philosophical inquiry that takes the core beliefs as primary: those beliefs not held in common are “further” or secondary beliefs. It is instructive to note here that in Faith and Reason, the final volume of his trilogy, Swinburne examines the role...