Power and Regionalism in Latin America: The Politics of MERCOSUR

Index

276 Index Ablin, Eduardo, 135 Acharya, Amitav, 216 agriculture in Brazil, 114, 174 subsidies for, 141, 185 Alencar, José, 182 Alfonsín, Raúl, 14 Alvarez Gaiani, Alberto, 107 Amorim, Celso, 182, 187, 188, 191 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 223–24 Argentina in automobile dispute, 62–64 —aftermath of, 88–89 —negotiations over, 81–88 —power sharing and bargaining among state actors, 79–81, 85, 91, 93 —societal pressures, 75–77, 91 —state actors’ incentives for defection, 77–79 —systemic incentives for cooperation, 79–81, 92 automobile industry in, 68, 75–77, 238n37, 239nn39–40 bandwagoning by, 79–80, 141 Brazilian penetration of market in, 102, 110–11, 245nn34–35 commercial dependence of, 54–55, 82, 94 convertibility system, 107–8, 131, 132, 135–38, 149, 169, 203, 247n24 country risk, 138, 247n23 currency devaluation in, 167, 168 debt, 106, 136, 138 defensive trade policy, 21, 141, 177 economic and trade liberalization in, 103, 177, 245n37 economic crisis (2001), 20, 149, 158 economic policy makers —in automobile dispute, 77–79, 80 —in footwear dispute, 105–8 —in post-2003 disputes, 177–78, 181 —in 2001 relaunch dispute, 135–42, 152 economy after 2003, 162, 202 European Union and, 139, 140, 141, 184 exchange rate regime in, 130, 135, 145, 148, 153, 167 Index 277 exports to Brazil, 82, 84, 240n56 in footwear dispute, 96–98 —negotiations over, 117–21 —power sharing and bargaining among state actors, 108–9, 121, 122 —societal pressures, 99–105, 122 —state actors’ incentives for defection, 105–8 —systemic incentives for cooperation, 108–9, 121, 123, 124 footwear industry in, 99–105, 134, 243n16, 244n23 foreign investments in, 78, 136, 240n48 foreign policy executive, 43, 206 —in automobile dispute, 79–81 —in footwear dispute, 105–6, 108–9, 124 —in post-2003 disputes, 181 —in 2001 relaunch dispute, 138–42, 152 foreign policy of, 79–80, 108–9, 240n50 Free Trade Area of the Americas and, 109, 120, 140, 184 household appliance industry in, 169–70, 251n28 imports by, 82, 102, 105, 106, 168–69, 177–78, 240n56, 243n20 Kirchner government policy in, 158, 176, 177, 184–85, 190–91, 202 list of disputes with Brazil, 16–20 MERCOSUR creation and, 14 NAFTA and, 72, 84, 120, 140 in post-2003 disputes —power sharing and bargaining among state actors, 180–81, 194 —societal pressures, 167–73, 194 —state actors’ incentives for defection, 177–78, 194 —systemic incentives for cooperation, 183–84, 192, 195 in 2001 relaunch dispute, 126–31, 158–62 —negotiations over, 147–53, 241nn66–71, 249n54 —power sharing and bargaining among state actors, 138–42, 153, 154, 156 —societal pressures, 131–35, 154, 247n13 —state actors’ incentives for defection, 135–38, 154 —systemic incentives for cooperation, 140–42, 155 sectoral agencies in, 44 strategic commitment to MERCOSUR, 72–73, 79, 82, 84, 108, 131, 140, 141–42, 148, 212–13 tariffs and duties, 86–87, 125, 135, 141, 142, 164, 239n46, 240nn60–61 textile industry in, 167–69 trade balance with Brazil, 88, 133, 136, 167, 251n20 United States and, 41, 55, 80, 84, 108–9, 128, 139, 140, 209 Venezuela and, 189, 192, 213, 216 Argentine Association of Automobile Sellers (ACARA), 75–76 Argentine-Brazilian Trade Monitoring Commission, 20–21, 157, 159, 161, 163, 164 Argentine Chamber of Electrical and Mechanical Household Appliances (CAFAEMEH), 165 Argentine Chamber of Gas Appliance Manufacturers (CAFAGAS), 164, 170 Argentine Chamber of Refrigerators and Air Conditioning Industries (CAIRAA), 164, 170 Argentine Chamber of the Auto Parts Industry (CAIA), 76 278 Index Argentine Federation of the Textile Industry (FITA), 162–63 Argentine Footwear Industry Chamber (CIC), 98, 105, 117 Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), 76, 99, 132, 134, 138, 167, 169, 170, 172 Argentine Viniculture Union (UVA), 174–75 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 220 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 220 Association of Argentine Automobile Assemblers (ADEFA), 75–76, 239n39 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 221, 222 asymmetrical strategic interdependence, 212–13 Automobile Industry Executive Group (GEIA, Brazil), 65 automobile sector dispute, 57, 61–94 about, 62–64 aftermath of, 88–89 bilateral negotiations and resolution —June 1995 agreement, 81–85 —Werneck-Magariños Agreement, 85–88, 241nn66–73, 242n74 conclusions about, 89–94 domestic constraints on Argentina in —power sharing and bargaining among state actors, 79–81, 85, 91, 93 —societal pressures, 75–77, 91 —state actors’ incentives for defection, 77–79 domestic constraints on Brazil in —power sharing and bargaining among state actors, 70–71, 72, 91 —societal pressures, 64–68, 91 —state actors’ incentives for defection...