233 Notes Chapter 1. Introduction 1. See, for example, Hanson and Klonsky (2007) and Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2007. 2. In June 2012, MERCOSUR members suspended Paraguay for a year, claiming a violation of the bloc’s democratic clause after President Fernando Lugo was abruptly impeached and replaced by Vice President Federico Franco. Paraguay was the only member that had not fully accepted Venezuela’s application to enter MERCOSUR because of opposition by the Senate. In a legally questionable move, leaders then proceeded to formally accept Venezuela as a full member. See “Chavez: Into Mercosur by a Side Door,” Financial Times, July 3, 2012. 3. Following Venezuela’s admission, Brazilian and Argentine leaders emphasized the “historic” implications of this move, which would make MERCOSUR the “fifth largest economy in the world” and “a new pole of power.” Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, quoted in “Mercosur ampliado: Fracaso o la quinta potencia del mundo?” Perfil, August 8, 2012; and Argentine President Cristina Kirchner, “With Venezuela Mercosur Has Become a New Pole of World Power,” MercoPress.com, August 6, 2012. http://en.mercopress .com/2012/07/31/with-venezuela-mercosur-has-become-a-new-pole-of-world - power. Recently, there have been rumors that indicate that Ecuador may be the sixth partner joining the bloc. See “Quito puja por ingresar al Mercosur con tratamiento diferenciado,” Ambito Financiero, August 19, 2012. 234 Notes to Pages 3–16 4. For an excellent overview, see Carranza (2006). 5. See, for example, “Mercosur: Dead in the Water,” Financial Times, May 15, 2002; and Llach (2012). Speculation about the bloc’s demise deepened recently with the suspension of Paraguay and admission of Venezuela. According to some, Venezuela’s entry confirms that “Mercosur increasingly adopts a clearer politico- strategic sense and functionality, rather than an economic- commercial one.” Roberto Bouzas, quoted in “Mercosur ampliado: Fracaso o la quinta potencia del mundo?” Perfil, August 8, 2012. See also “Mercosur: RIP?” Economist, July 14, 2012; and “Uruguay industries lobby questions the growing political predominance in Mercosur,” MercoPress.com, August 2, 2012. http://en.mercopress.com/2012/08/02/uruguay-industries-lobby-questions -the-growing-political-predominance-in-mercosur. 6. For examples of “Merco- pessimism,” see Cammack (2002) and Richards (1997). More optimistic accounts can be found in Cason (2000) and Phillips (2003). 7. For a discussion on the controversies surrounding the definition of these two terms (“regions” and “regionalism”), see Mansfield and Milner (1999) and Hurrell (1995b). 8. Other scholars emphasizing the role of the United States in the construction of regional orders throughout the world include Ikenberry (2000) and Buzan and Wæver (2003). 9. Exceptions include Duina (2006) and Acharya and Johnston (2007). 10. Along similar lines, Lobell (2009) argues that the ability of foreign policy executives to pursue balancing strategies depends on the degree of consensus and support they can obtain from key societal supporters. Chapter 2. Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the Southern Cone 1. For a comprehensive account of both the features of and the factors accounting for this rapprochement in the late 1970s, see Hurrell (1998) and Campbell, Rozemberg, and Svarzman (1999). 2. For a more detailed account of the origins and early stages of MERCOSUR , see Hurrell (1995a; 1998) and Manzetti (1994). 3. See Grieco (1997). 4. I use a seven- point ordinal scale to measure and compare the intensity and degree of tension generated by each of these measures. This “tension coefficient” takes into account whether a formal complaint was presented and the media coverage that the incident received, as well as the level of confrontation it triggered among partners, including the extent to which the dispute seemed to escalate to the point that the bloc’s longer- term continuity came to be doubted. Notes to Pages 16–33 235 5. Crisis Index for year j = ∑ [vi ti] , where vi = each violation in year j and ti = the tension coefficient for the dispute triggered by that particular unilateral measure. 6. This five- category nominal scale is similar to the one used by Odell (1985). 7. I use CB for compromises favoring Brazil, and CA for compromises favoring Argentina. A perfectly balanced agreement would hypothetically be represented as CC. 8. In applying mainstream International Relations (IR) and International and Comparative Political Economy theories to the study of regional dynamics in South America, I depart from the early literature on regional integration, which was dramatically influenced by the European experience. In line with the literature discussed in chapter 1 (e.g., Moravcsik 1998...