No Religion without Idolatry: Mendelssohn's Jewish Enlightenment

Chapter 8: Philosophy of Enlightened Judaism

C H A P T E R 8 Philosophy of Enlightened Judaism Mendelssohn’s Judaism is based on “natural religion,” the belief in God, in providence, and in afterlife. He adopts this conception of natural religion that was widely accepted in the eighteenth century and does not substantially add to it. The truths of natural religion seemed obvious to him. As a rule, it was not necessary to argue for them; it sufficed to remind people of these truths. Proofs of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul belonged to metaphysics, a special occupation of specialists, designed to answer skeptics and sophists. On the presupposed basis of natural religion, there are two further steps to take in order to justify Judaism: an argument for religion as a social practice and for Judaism rather than for another religion. The necessity of the first step is usually overlooked. This is presumably so because the argument for a specific religion normally implies eo ipso an argument for religion as such. However, the argument cannot be reversed : on the basis of natural religion, we may argue that religious practice is not meaningful or that it is meaningful in principle but that no extant religion is adequate. Mendelssohn believed both that religious practice is meaningful and that (his understanding of) Judaism was adequate . Differently put, he thought that no present religion is adequate but that Judaism is least inadequate and can be reformed to become adequate . Maimon, on the other hand, believed that no religious practice can in principle be adequate. I will consider their positions in turn. 185 186 No Religion without Idolatry The term natural religion is somewhat misleading. It refers to certain beliefs but not to a religious practice of a community, an order of life, and a cult. It is, therefore, not an existing, independent religion but a part or an aspect of a religion. How, then, is the transition from certain truths to practice conceived? What is religion as distinguished from so-called natural religion? In his autobiography, Maimon answers the question twice. He first defines religion as “the expression of gratitude, reverence etc., which arise from the dependence of our weal and woe on one or more powers to us unknown” (GW 1, 150; Murray, 111), but with specific reference to Judaism, Maimon defines true religion (natural as well as revealed) as consisting “in a contract . . . between man and the Supreme Being” (GW 1, 245; Murray, 177). Whereas Mendelssohn might have endorsed Maimon’s first definition, they both believed that the second is a misunderstanding. The thoughtful reader, comments Maimon, understands that this idea of a covenant between God and man is to be taken “merely analogically” and is based on anthropomorphism: “the Supreme Being has no wants” (GW 1, 246; Murray, 178). And Mendelssohn explains: “God is not a being who needs our benevolence, requires our assistance, or claims any of our rights for his own use, or whose rights can ever clash or be confused with ours” (Jerusalem, 57, 58–59; see also the definition of a contract , 54–55). There cannot be a contract between God and a human being. So-called duties toward God are, in reality, duties toward ourselves and our fellow men. Moral philosophy and religion coincide in their content; religion “only gives those same duties and obligations a more exalted sanction” (Jerusalem, 58) and a motivation to act upon them. How does religion do this? First by supporting the truths of religion with arguments—rigorous or not—that are “not only convincing, but edifying, moving the mind and spurring conduct conforming with this knowledge” (JubA 2, 311; Dahlstrom, 293, translation modified); and second by “mutual edification,” which is the “most essential purpose of religious society”; “by the magic power of sympathy,” which transfers “truth from the mind to the heart” (Jerusalem, 74). This, hence, is the justification of religious practice in addition to natural religion. Religious practice forms a community, is the medium of education, and mo- Philosophy of Enlightened Judaism 187 tivates the practitioners to act according to ethical-religious truths. It allows the expression of emotions, and it should also arouse them. The question is, though, whether the character of communal religious practice does not undermine other essential purposes, above all enlightenment . Maimon has already answered this question. Religious rite and anthropomorphism are inseparable...