The Writings of Charles De Koninck: Volume 1

Critical Considerations

section three Critical Considerations It seems to us that there is nothing in these fundamental theses of Eddington ’s critique of science that we could contest. On the contrary. The fundamental points of this new philosophy of science have already been explained by a scholastic author.63 Others have wanted to incorporate them in scholastic philosophy, but the incorporation has resulted in a transformation such that they can no longer be recognized. The philosophy of science of M. Maritain is no longer at all that of Eddington or of Renoirte.64 Renoirte has been contradicted and Eddington sifted. But Eddington cannot be sifted. Renoirte has formulated these theses in precise terms for scholastic readers. The terminology of Eddington is less familiar, and sometimes vague, he is not a professional philosopher. It is that which allows M. Maritain to disengage the points which appear most interesting to him and to neglect or simply contradict the rest. What is important is not that M. Maritain does not accept the fundamental definitions. He assimilates only the superstructure, but this no longer has the meaning attributed to it by Eddington. We are convinced that the theses of Eddington with all their consequences must be accepted. There is no choice to make. We hope to justify this position. We will study the problem of the object of physical science and its immediate consequences. Then the problem of indeterminism. This is rather new and has not been criticized in scholastic circles, save in book reviews which do not justify the criticism.As to what concerns physical theory, the doctrine of Eddington is commonly accepted and one even finds some texts in St. Thomas suggestive of it. We will be concerned with the first two problems. First of all, is there a philosophy of science and what does it include? What is the meaning of these “philosophical consequences” of science?  The philosophy of science is that branch of general philosophy which especially studies the situation and significance of the mathematical and experimental sciences in the ensemble of our knowledge. In that which concerns physics in particular, it studies what constitutes this science formally, delimits its proper field, and determines the general significance of its object . All that precedes the work of the physicist himself. Some theses, like that of the point of view of relativity and the point of view of indeterminism , are theses in the philosophy of science which have nothing to do with properly physical principles. But there is a very important distinction to be made between the ideal philosophy and ours, which progresses in a human fashion. From time to time physicists remind us that professional philosophers have forgotten to treat one or another problem, and even that they are mistaken. Physicists defend unmistakably philosophical theses which were attacked by professional philosophers. But none of that has to do with the philosophy of science. The relativity of Einstein has drawn the attention of philosophers to the philosophical problem of relativity and Eddington does the same thing for indeterminism. Are these problems consequences of scientific theses? Historically, yes, But even this concession is too broad. For Einstein and Eddington have first posited these philosophical principles before being able to construct their properly physical theory in a logical way. It is only in this sense that we can speak of philosophical consequences. The properly scientific conclusions never acquire a philosophical sense.There is no continuity here. The certitude of no matter what physical thesis does not make it a philosophical truth, and it is not necessarily less true for that. It belongs to another domain of knowledge. But all that shows the importance of the development itself of the sciences. They constitute with regard to their formal aspects isolated compartments, but in practice we are interdependent with regard to the signification of certain problems raised.“Philosopher ”and“physicist”are not abstract beings. It is man who must disentangle the problems. A philosopher who ignores the sciences does himself a wrong, he will not even succeed in posing properly philosophical problems. The physicist cannot ignore all philosophical problems, he necessarily presupposes them. The problem of the possibility of a science of the physical world, and its necessary conditions, is a properly philosophical problem.  | Charles De Koninck Chapter I. On the Object of Physics 1. The Thesis Since it has been said that the developments of Eddington on this subject...