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The Genesis of K.E. Løgstrup’s View of Morality as a Substitute Kees van Kooten Niekerk In his book Opgør med Kierkegaard (Controverting Kierkegaard) Løgstrup presents a Kantian transformation of the biblical story of the Good Samaritan. According to him, the original story tells us how the Samaritan, moved by mercy, spontaneously took charge of the victim of assault, his thoughts occupied by the victim’s needs and the question of how best to come to his aid. But we can imagine, Løgstrup continues, that the Samaritan was tempted to pass by and leave the victim to his fate. In that case he could have come to realize that it was his duty to aid the victim, and this realization could have made him take charge of the victim nevertheless. If so, he would not have acted out of mercy, but out of duty. His act would have been a moral act. As such it would have been a substitute for acting out of mercy. Løgstrup recognizes, of course, that this is better than brutality or indifference. However, at the same time he emphasizes that the Kantian Samaritan’s act, being a substitute , is inferior to the biblical Samaritan’s acting spontaneously out of mercy (SEL, 76). Løgstrup substantiates this claim by comparing the role of motivation in acts of mercy and corresponding acts of duty. In acts of mercy, the agent is motivated by the need of another person and by the intended result of his or her action, consisting in the removal of obstacles to the other’s flourishing. The 55 C H A P T E R T H R E E Andersen-03 10/19/07 1:51 PM Page 55 agent is completely engaged in caring for the other. In corresponding acts of duty, on the other hand, engagement and its inherent motivation have been disrupted. Now, duty—that is, the sense of the rightness of the action—is resorted to as a fresh motive. This motive, however, is only a substitute for the motivation inherent in the original engagement. The same applies to virtue, which Løgstrup describes as a disposition to act motivated by “the thought and the sense of the rightness of the action,” that is, as a disposition to act out of duty. He concludes: “Just as duty is a substitute motive, virtue is a substitute disposition” (SEL, 78). According to Løgstrup the problem with these substitutes is that the engagement with the other and the world is loosened. “[T]he thought of and sense of the rightness of the act are given independent status and are interposed. . . . [T]he motive is no longer drawn from the consequences that the action will have for the lives of others and for society, but is sought in the individual himself.” The individual is thrown back upon himself or herself. Therefore, “[d]uty and virtue are moral introversions .” And Løgstrup adds that the thought of the rightness of the action involved in duty and virtue naturally evokes a “rapture at one’s own righteousness” (SEL, 78–79). The above quotations about duty and virtue as substitutes and introversions suggest that Løgstrup is making a general point. Indeed, he uses the example of the Good Samaritan to say something about morality in general. The Samaritan’s mercy is an instance of what he calls the “sovereign expressions of life.” These are, roughly, spontaneous, otherregarding impulses or modes of conduct such as trust, mercy, and sincerity . What Løgstrup claims is that morality is secondary and inferior to the sovereign expressions of life. In his own words: “Morality exists to deliver substitute motives to substitute actions because the sovereign and spontaneous expressions of life, with their attachment to what the act is intended to achieve, either fail to materialize or are stifled” (SEL, 78). It is not so easy to make out what Løgstrup, in the present context, means by “morality.” In any case, as secondary and inferior to the sovereign expressions of life, morality must be distinguished from them. Indeed, Løgstrup characterizes the sovereign expressions of life as “premoral ” (SEL, 77). In the section of Opgør med Kierkegaard that ends with the example of the Good Samaritan (SEL, 72–76), he uses “morality” (Danish: moral) first as a designation of customary ethics. However, he Kees van Kooten Niekerk 56 Andersen-03 10/19/07 1:51 PM Page 56 [18.117.165...

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